Arvind Subramanian

The unprecedented lovefest between India and the United States has been striking and, frankly, puzzling.

As neoliberalism swiftly gives way to a resurgence of industrial policy in advanced economies, the perspective of low-income countries is being ignored.

One cannot deny the fact that there are too many overconfident experts making too many predictions about too many issues too quickly these days. A basic economic principle is useful here: the 24-hour news cycle has created a huge need for expert opinion, and the market has simply created the supply to meet the growing demand.

A global subsidy war could spur technological innovation, potentially driving down the price of renewables.

The global shocks have proven to be particularly damaging for China because they have come on top of an ongoing, secular loss of competitiveness.

Ravaged periodically by natural calamities, long dependent on foreign aid and remittances, and a perennial source of refugees and emigrants, Bangladesh was once “a basket case of misery,” as Zia Haider Rahman put it in his great debut novel, In the Light of What We Know.

The lack of representation of marginalised groups in the corridors of power—political, financial, and cultural—is a growing source of global concern.

When the billionaire investor Ray Dalio recently predicted that the Chinese renminbi will become a global reserve currency, the world took notice.

As Sri Lanka makes another crucial political transition, it faces a major risk of macroeconomic instability. Minimising that risk will depend, above all, on whether the country’s newly elected president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, can defy his reputation and embrace inclusive politics.

Almost a decade ago, China bulls like Martin Jacques and I predicted the rise of the People’s Republic at the expense of a declining United States. Today, with the two superpowers unabashedly jostling for hegemony—their trade war being just one sign of this—it is time for a fresh assessment.

For an all-too-brief period between the late 1980s and the late 2000s, the world was characterised by convergence, both ideological and economic. The West and the Rest agreed that an open liberal order was the best way to increase prosperity. Now, however, this ideological order threatens to unravel, with adverse consequences for the world economy.