Advantage to Koizumi

By Monzurul Huq writes from Tokyo
10 September 2005, 18:00 PM
When Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi dissolved the lower house of the Japanese Diet on August 4 and called snap elections, analysts were puzzled by this bold step, as he went ahead with the decision despite strong opposition from senior party members. Many thought the step suicidal, as in recent years the main ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was increasingly losing ground, particularly in urban Japan, giving way mostly to the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

As a result, it was an obvious calculation many resorted to that the Prime Minister was handing over a precious gift to the leadership of the DPJ. It was more because the main issue surrounding the dissolution of the lower house was postal reform, a matter that affects directly the well-being of rural Japan, the traditional support base of the LDP. Moreover, the rebellion within the LDP had virtually split the party, which too was seen by many as an important factor for the opposition to gain most out of the untimely election.

But as the people Japan are getting ready to cast their ballots in one of the most significant elections in recent years, it is becoming clearer that the gamble Koizumi had taken by calling snap elections at a difficult time is probably going to bring hefty benefits for him. Japan watchers are as a result deeply confused by the possible outcome, and pondering over the important question of what made Koizumi sound so magical that he not only was able to liquidate the threat of rebellion within the party, but also could successfully corner his main rival the DPJ, to the extent that the main opposition's own existence now might come under serious scrutiny.

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the LDP. Japan's two right-wing conservative parties of the early 1950s, the Democrats and the Liberals, decided to merge their parties in an effort to counter the growing popularity of the Socialists and formed the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955. Ever since, the party has been in power, with the exception of a brief period spanning less than a year in 1993, when a coalition of other parties formed a government that did not last for long. Subsequently LDP regained its position of power by forming coalitions, first with the Social Democratic Party of Japan, and then with Komeito, a political party closely associated with the lay Buddhist organisation known as Soka Gakkai. The second coalition is still functioning, not only in the process of forming the government, but also in the electoral contest as well.

This past scenario gives a clear picture of the influence of LDP in Japanese politics. Holding the position of power for half a century in an advanced democracy itself can be considered a record. If we include the period when Democrats and Liberals alternated power sharing in post war Japan until 1955, then the span moves further to engulf virtually the whole post World War II period.

Traditionally this was made possible due to the party's expansion of support base in rural Japan. While LDP's main rival was busy expanding its support base in industrial belts with the idea of winning support of the working class, LDP systematically initiated land reform policy that benefited farmers and rural population who eventually became the main pillars of the party's strongholds throughout the country.

In urban centres, the party targeted the middle class who benefited most out of its policy of economic growth. The set-up of this support base for the ruling and the opposition camps in Japan continued until the busting of Japan's bubble economy in late 1980s that exposed the shaky foundation of the country's economic might. Since then the LDP has been gradually losing support in urban Japan, particularly among the middle class, who were hit hardest by the declining economy that saw an increase in jobless rate and a sharp fall in land, property, and stock prices. The period also coincided with the massive increase in the number of urban population. Rural Japan, on the other hand, started to feel the effects of depopulation. The situation was supposed to give a big boost to the position of Japan's opposition political parties. But this didn't happen for several reasons.

First, Japan's political opposition throughout the Cold War period was dominated by the prominence of the Socialist Party of Japan. Other smaller opposition parties like the Communist Party of Japan and Komeito were largely confined within their limited support bases, the limited support that they still enjoy. The end of the Cold War and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union dealt a severe blow to the ideological footings of the Socialists, and the party, by failing to address various issues during the crucial transitional period, has eventually been marginalised to the extent that it could win only four seats in the last general election.

Many of its prominent members left the party and joined hands with the deserters from the LDP to form a new party in 1993 that briefly came to power under the leadership of Morihiro Hosokawa. The deserters from two of Japan's largest political groups are trying since then to form a viable opposition capable of dislodging the LDP from its position of power. But the rift within the leadership as well as rank and file of newly emerging opposition blocks, of which DPJ is the latest version, after going through several earlier attempts, remains as wide as ever, and hence they have so far failed to prove that they represent a viable opposition capable of running the country more efficiently than the ruling coalition.

Second, on several crucial issues, most importantly on the issue of postal privatisation the merits of which Koizumi is trying relentlessly to convince people of, the DPJ has failed miserably to provide an alternative. The party in effect supports the privatisation, but failed to convince people why in that case it opposed the bills in the Diet. The result is a gradual shifting of public opinion, particularly of those undecided voters who were earlier tilting towards the DPJ, to the Koizumi camp.

Koizumi, on the other hand, has successfully proved himself to be one of the greatest manipulators in Japanese politics in recent days. Despite creating a deep rift within the party by his high-handed attitude in dealing with the dissidents, he now looks not only capable of filling the vacuum of those who left the party by winning over support from the opposition DPJ, but also seems to be heading towards a victory that would allow him to depend less on the junior coalition partner.

According to various opinion polls, LDP is almost set to win a majority in the lower house. The biggest loser will no doubt be the main opposition DPJ, which, according to predictions, might lose as many as 20 seats.

This would no doubt put Japan's largest opposition into the process of new soul searching, which might lead to another stage of trial and error, delaying further the emergence of a true democratic atmosphere in Japan, in which an alteration of parties in power allows voters, at least overtly, to think that they are an essential component of the political game.