An anatomy of lawmakers' salary increases

Economic rationale underscores four reasons for salary increases:

• Cost of living adjustment to keep pace with inflation rate (preferably at the rate of productivity growth);
• "Bracket creep" applicable to a graduated income tax structure, which causes upper income group falling too close or even behind lower income group;
• Suddenly the country becomes overly rich from discoveries of oil reserves, and other minerals and the government is running sustained budget surpluses;
• "Do as we please" attitude of exercising selfish power.

Since independence, government employees' salaries have been raised six times. The PM has seen seven increases and the ministers nine. Salary is only a drop in the bucket of the perquisites these elected people enjoy. Who are they kidding if they want us to believe that they make a living on government salaries alone? It is the future stream of perquisites, not the salary, not the exalted glamour of lawmaking, for which they get elected by hook or by crook.

Did these politicians really become MPs for lawmaking and if so, why their lack of quorum became so endemic that the PM had to threaten them with forfeiture of their right to nomination in the 2007 election? Might the reason why the ruling party MPs find parliamentary deliberations of little interest because of the provisions of the article 70(1) of the constitution, which reads,

"A person elected as a Member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he resigns from that party or votes in Parliament against that party."

These government MPs, however, never missed sessions when called for to enact self-serving laws to overpack their pockets and wallets. They import tax-free vehicles (now a second one) depriving the already beleaguered exchequer of the much needed revenue. They live in rent-free and furnished apartments constructed for the guests of 2002 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference. Soon after coming to power, the alliance government converted this guest house into one for the MPs. Luxurious accommodations were already built for them attached to the parliament building.

The politicians are elected to serve the interests of the people, but it seems they have developed a taste for oiling their own machines and exercising the right of precedence over those of common citizens and public servants in every distribution of benefits by the government. They are relishing grandiose lifestyles only heard of being accorded to Russian communists before the emergence of glasnost and perestroika. Table 2 displays the official perks and privileges of ministers.

The PM and the cabinet enjoy other privileges which include a block fund equivalent to the real expenditure, free government vehicles, telephone usage, travel, etc. PM Khaleda Zia lives in a house donated by the state after the assassination of President Zia as living quarters for his family free, and the PM now receives Tk. 50,000.00 as rent per month for that very house. She was also donated the ownership of a mansion in Gulshan for rental income for maintenance of her family at that time. There is also an official residence of the PM, in addition to her big office compound on the old airport road and another in the Secretariat. Why would the PM of a poor country need so many exquisite facilities with expensive state of the art security apparatus encircling them all?

In his much acclaimed "habit theory" dealing with consumption, economist James Duesenberry in 1952 developed the hypothesis which showed that once consumption habits are formed, it is not that easy to give it up. He explained the formation of two habits:

'Internal habits' which are formed by influences of past choices on our current consumption behavior, while 'external habits' are developed out of consumption choices of one's social environment.

Although the habit hypothesis was developed to explain people's consumption behaviour, nonetheless the theory's basic tenets are more in conformity with our MPs, and ministers' consumption profiles and social behaviour than most common citizens. The external habit of our lawmakers is formed by the influences of their types, and internal habit is already ingrained from up-bringing and family pressures. These two habits make them so stogy that they do things without being circumspect.

The duties of MPs are law making and holding the torch of the rule of law. Unfortunately, at every opportunity, they poke their nose in local government affairs of their constituencies in search of milk and honey. The previous AL government enacted a law to make the institution of Upazila government vibrant and participatory, but the BNP government did nothing to implement it. Other preoccupations of many MPs include influence peddling and lobbying for the award of lucrative public procurement projects, contacts, and licenses. Governance has descended to "dividing the cake and grabbing as many pieces as you can" for these lawmakers. They give the perception that they are the untouchables and have license and latitude to evade the law.

The members of the cabinet and the lawmakers often act openly contrary to public interest. A glaring example is the Communication Minister's allocations of a prime railway land in the heart of Dhaka city for a nominal charge to an organisation headed by his wife. Influence peddling by their offspring and family members in securing contacts and licenses, awarding gas fields and power projects to inexperienced and higher bidding firms have become the norms rather than exceptions. Could these happen without the tacit acquiescence of the powerful elites? The recent steps to arrests the Chief Whip's two sons, is just one gaudy example of how nightmarish the conditions have turned out for real estate developers, shopping mall owners, opening new businesses and running the old ones.

Another issue of public discourse is why the MPs who are supported by the tax payers are treated differentially from any other government employees. For example, public servants who remain absent from work without prior approval face disciplinary action and for prolonged absence may potentially be succumbed to dismissal.

Since 1996 opposition MPs made it a tradition to boycott parliament sessions (in genuine protest or on flimsy pretexts) but draw all benefits including pay and allowances as usual. The AL-led opposition MPs have been boycotting the parliament on the ground for being shut out from parliamentary deliberations and debate. Their absence, however, paved the hocus-pocus manner of conducting parliamentary affairs by the ruling MPs in making and breaking laws at whim. Exploitong a loophole in the House rule, the absentee MPs attend parliament sessions once in every 90 days to save their JS membership and hence their salaries and perks.

This act of boycotting the parliament is incompatible with the burden of responsibilities they pledged to shoulder before being elected. If they are obstructed to participate in the parliamentary affairs they should still attend the sessions, perhaps with their lips sealed with black tape to show their predicament. They should resort to boycotting the parliament only when the situation becomes totally humiliating and then seek the guidance of the people who elected them in the first place. At that point, they should give up all their perks and privileges on the principle of "no work, no pay."

In our current parliament a vast number of members are businessmen; most of them have little or no prior political training and lawmaking background. So what kind of legislation can one expect from them? How can these already rich lawmakers vote themselves salary raises twice in three years when beggars are crawling on all fours on the city streets and rural markets and when our development partners are pouring in aid for poverty alleviation which is progressing only at a miserable annual rate of 0.52 percent?

Isn't it obvious that politicians win election not to uphold a political ideology or implement a particular economic policy, but rather to promote their business and vested interests? Seemingly then, winning election is a guaranteed protection of their riches and means of becoming richer. Being rich is not a crime, but becoming rich at the cost of the people who elected them is reprehensible.

The authors are, respectively, Professor of Economics, Eastern Michigan University and former Secretary to the Government of Bangladesh.