Bush's visit to Europe: Mending fences with allies?

Sitting in Paris around the last millennium and beginning of the new, I had seen the beginning of the current trans-Atlantic divide. Bush's predecessor Bill Clinton, a Rhodes scholar, had won the heart of the Europeans through his charisma, intelligence, and political acumen and, more importantly, due to his capacity to listen to them and work out a consensus for trans-Atlantic action. When Bush assumed the Presidency, the Europeans felt that his administration was not showing the traditional sensitivity to their areas of concern and was opting for a more unilateralist approach. Washington's refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol, the Land Mine Treaty and International Court for trial of military crimes, etc badly hurt the Europeans as they had worked for years to build consensus on those issues.

Then came the 9/11 terrorist attack and the Europeans, despite their apparent displeasure with the Bush administration, openly expressed their full support for and solidarity with the Americans in their fight against global terrorism. I was pleasantly surprised when the renowned French Socialist mouth

piece, Le Monde, came out with the headline, "We are all Americans" on 12 September 2001. The Europeans were, thus, somewhat disappointed when Washington went pretty much on its own to launch the military offensive against the Al Qaeda terrorists and their sponsor, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. After the initial military offensive, the Europeans, however, came forward and helped Washington cope with the post-war reconstructions and maintenance of security in

Afghanistan.

Most of the European countries have sizeable Muslim population. Israeli excesses in the occupied territories in the wake of 9/11 and its endorsement by US, and large-scale arrest of Muslim militants from across the globe by Washington, and their prolonged detention at the Guantanamo military base, also created delicate internal political problems for those countries.

Then came the Iraq War. Washington was predetermined to invade Iraq. The major European countries that have been dealing with terrorist problems in their own countries for decades, felt that the invasion of Iraq would inevitably weaken global consensus to fight against international terrorism. France and Germany, supported by China, Russia and a host of developing countries, wanted to give the UN a chance to peacefully resolve the issue. Washington went ahead with the invasion. Barring UK, most of the NATO heavyweights, like France and Germany, refused to join the US-led invasion. Italy, Spain and some East European states, under pressure from US, made some token participation, but it was Washington that had to bear the brunt. The situation turned really sour when the major European allies were contemptuously termed "old Europe", and their companies were barred from taking part in international tender for Iraqi war-reconstruction projects.

After his re-election, Bush has clearly felt the urgency to restore normal climate in transAtlantic relations. The change in Bush's tone during the just-concluded visit was very apparent. Gone was the previous arrogance, and in its place a friendlier and smiling US President trying to charm the old European allies. Bush, in his "new era" speech at European Union headquarters in Brussels used the term "alliance" twelve times. It seemed as if Bush had discovered Europe after long four years, and the Europeans had decided to recognise him as the elected President of the sole superpower.

Behind the scenes efforts were made by both sides to hedge any open discord. The public pronouncements merely talked about 'common values' but did not set out any 'common strategy' for facing the current challenges. The Europeans were not sure whether Washington was prepared to give up unilateralism; Washington on its part was also not certain what it can obtain in return from Europe.

Washington's priority issues were greater European involvement in Iraq, stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear arsenal, taking concrete action to pressurize Damascus to withdraw troops from Lebanon, restoration of democracy in Russia, and lifting of arms embargo against China. On all these issues the trans-Atlantic divide was obvious, but both sides decided not to bring them in the fore.

Washington views the recent elections in Iraq as a great success, and felt that it was a good time to seek greater European involvement in war- reconstructions efforts in Iraq. The Europeans did not share the perception. France, Germany and other European powers felt that their opposition to the invasion of Iraq had been fully vindicated, as Washington had failed to produce any evidence of weapons of mass destruction or connection between Saddam regime and Al-Qaeda or other militant terrorist groups. They did not agree to get involved in Iraq, as Washington had wished, but nevertheless agreed to intensify their training programme of Iraqi security forces and provide other technical assistance.

On Iran, both Americans and Europeans believe in the same objective, that Iran should not have nuclear arsenal, but they differ in their policies. The Europeans believe in 'stick and carrot' policy: give Tehran some compensatory incentives to abandon the nuclear ambition. Although France, Germany and Britain have not yet succeeded in reaching an accord with Iran, they would like US to join them in the current negotiations. On the other hand Washington, at the instigation of Tel Aviv, has a more rigid policy, and believes that the onus is on Iran, and any non-compliance on its part should be severely dealt with. A full- scale US invasion of Iraq at this stage looks somewhat unlikely, but if Europe-Iran negotiations fail, then it could very well encourage the hawks in Washington and Tel Aviv to undertake a surgical attack against Iran's nuclear installations. Europe is opposed to any military action at this stage. Washington's effort to persuade Russia to stop supplying nuclear fuel and equipment to Iran also did not succeed.

Europeans, in view of their historical ties with the Middle East, believe that the peace process should be resumed to diffuse the current tension in the region and Washington should put more pressure on Israel. As regards the emerging crisis in Lebanon, they do not support the hard-line policy of Washington on Syria, and would like to continue with their diplomatic pressure on Damascus for withdrawal of their troops from Lebanon and non-interference in Lebanese internal affairs.

There are also disagreements on the issue of lifting of arms embargo on arms sale to China, which was imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen Square attack. Europe, as the largest trading power for China, would like to lift the sanction and develop closer ties with Beijing. Washington would like to go slow on this issue. Bush's meeting with Putin in Bratislava also fell short of target, as the latter neither agreed to Washington's prescription of Russian democracy nor to discontinue nuclear collaboration with Iran or supplying missiles to Syria. The only area of accord was their bilateral nuclear agreement that could reduce the potential threat of nuclear terrorism by speeding up the much delayed securing and dismantling of some of Russia's nuclear materials.

Despite their differences, the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic expressed their resolve to put their past discord aside and to make an effort to evolve broad contours of future trans-Atlantic cooperation. Both sides should also recognise some realities on the ground. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, a new unified Europe has emerged that no longer needs security protection from Washington. This has also encouraged the Europeans to expand their EU cooperation, which has led to its emergence as the single largest unified market in the industrialised world. Yet Europe must recognise the obvious fact that they need Washington's military muscle to uphold the western values in this era of globalisation. On the other hand, United States, despite its overwhelming military superiority, needs the cooperation of its long-standing European allies for the latter's global standing and acceptability in its pursuit to establish global primacy. The new trans-Atlantic equation, therefore, has to be based on more equality and flexibility. The sooner both sides recognised this fact the better they would do.

Syed Muazzem Ali, a former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, served as Ambassador to France.