The chimera of UN reforms

Efforts are now underway to enlarge the Security Council so that there is broader representation. The question is whether such a move will enable the UN Security Council and the UN System to play a more significant role in a US dominated world.

The precept of UN Charter reform with concomitant institutional changes have been on multilateral agenda for some time. It is interesting to note however that in nearly 60 years, there have been only three amendments to the UN Charter -- all dealing only with seat numbers in two of the six principal organs -- once for the Security Council and on two occasions for the UN Economic and Social Council. It has been rare but 'reform' of sorts have taken place. Constitutional reform has been unusual, but reform measures of administrative nature have not been so uncommon. With changes of UN Secretaries General we have also seen routine policy changes in personnel structure and management techniques.

The issue that nevertheless continues to draw world attention is that of meaningful change reflecting changing world politics and its growing membership.

It would be important to recall here that UN founders deliberately appear to have composed a limited Security Council (with unanimity among the great powers being a pre-requisite) because they believed that this would help to maintain peace. This was in contrast with the League of Nations' earlier format of a general executive committee for all of that Organisation's functions. It was felt that the League's structure would not work in a post Second World War scenario that demanded many decisions of substance.

This elitist approach was opposed by some during the San Francisco Conference where the UN Charter was drafted, but formation of the UN was not impeded because general opinion anticipated some review soon. In fact, Article 109 of the UN Charter envisaged the scope for a General Conference 'for the purpose of reviewing the Charter'. Accessing to this however became impossible given the polarisation of UN member countries during the Cold War and subsequently because the Permanent 5 also viewed any such challenge as being negative to their vested interests.

Decolonisation in the Sixties increased UN membership from 51 to 114 and led to newly decolonised members demanding a better reflection of their priorities within the UN system. This sentiment led to a historic debate during the 18th UN General Assembly and serious lobbying during the next year. This eventually resulted in the Security Council membership being expanded in 1965 from 11 to 15 on the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution No. 1990 adopted earlier in December 1963. This change in membership structure of the Security Council settled matters for the next two and half decades among the grumbling constituents.

Aspiration for reform went dormant, but did not really die. Peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan, Namibia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, end of the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait relit the focus and the ambition in many countries to play a more central role. They wanted not only to be able to defend their views in the Security Council but also wanted to translate this into the power of vote within that Council. These States expressed the necessity to restructure the Security Council's composition and its 'anachronistic procedures.'

The P-5 have been stonewalling this move by pointing out that there has been a steep decline in the use of substantive vetoes and that there have been only 12 such invocations between January 1990 and June 2003 as opposed to 193 over the preceding 45 years. This explanation has nevertheless not satisfied Germany, Japan, India, Egypt, Brazil and Nigeria.

Any possibility of UN Security Council reform has also been greatly reduced because of a kind of 'political paralysis' that exists within the non Permanent-5 community over important factors. They are today apparently unable to decide on their candidatures for the newly permanent seats in the Security Council, the total number acceptable for expansion, their geographical distribution and also on how these additional seats will rotate through the various geographical regions.

Within the industrialised countries, bickering is going on over whether Italy should be bypassed in favour of Germany and Japan. Similarly, within South Asia the ambition of India is being opposed by its rival Pakistan. Argentina is equally unhappy with Brazil being perceived as the natural candidate from South America. There is also competition from South Africa with regard to Nigeria.

All these aspects and factors are still being debated by a Group with the lengthiest name in the 'annals of multilateral deliberations' -- the Oewgqerimscomrsc-standing for the 'Open-ended Working Group on the question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the Group on the Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council'. The very nature of the name of this Group indicates the latent difficulties being faced within the Group pertaining to any form of decision making. I believe, it is most unlikely that any consensus will emerge from their deliberations.

The fact that the US has emerged as the only Superpower with global reach has complicated matters further. It has marginalised the United Nations and the rest of the world. It has also not helped that the European Union is still so divided over its Common Security and Defense Policy and that the NATO has grown weaker in terms of resources.

Some criticise the USA today as having become 'hegemonistic' and intolerant of multilateral efforts within the matrix of the United Nations. This is probably true.

However, the reason for the downward slide in the influence of the UN appears to be directly related to the resource constraint that it faces every time it seeks to play an effective role. The UN finds that its operations are dependent largely on US largesse and financial support. This consequently creates a situation where a threat is seen to be grave enough for UN intervention only if it fits the US prescription.

This approach also materially reduces the possibility of other countries being able to exert pressure on the USA so that it agrees to UN reform.

Professor Thomas G. Weiss has correctly pointed out in his recent article on the United Nations in 'The Washington Quarterly' (Autumn 2003) that the UN faces essentially two problems when the Security Council will act "as a multiplier for US power" and "how it can persuade the US that acting multilaterally will be in its interest." Events, as they continue to unfold in Iraq bear testimony to these raw nerves.

As it stands today, it is unlikely that the built-in advantage of veto will be lost soon through another General Assembly Emergency Special Session and the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure. The last time this happened was in the early 1960s (the Congo crisis) and has not come to pass since. Nevertheless, universal moral pressure will probably be the more effective method for creating the necessary restraint in the exercise of the veto wielding powers.

The situation within the UN framework is bound to a great extent by rhetoric. This will make important reform less than likely. Consistent with existing concern, there will in all probably be small measures that will lead to more openness and 'democratic accountability' in decision making of the Security Council. There may also be greater visibility of important deliberations and decisions, through candid and open exchanges with independent experts and representatives of civil society. These steps will not require Charter changes and will therefore not be viewed as a 'mixed bag' by the Permanent Members.

The international political process will urge greater scrutiny and will demand reform. However, whether we like it or not, hunt for change in the structure of UN Organs will have to have the core blessings of Washington. The match will have to be played out in that capital and the result declared later in New York. It is also unlikely that this will happen in a US Presidential Election year.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.