China-South Asia factor in global environmental politics

China's oil demand in 2004 was 2.4 million barrels/day (mbd) of oil (2004) vs. 1.38 mbd in 2003. China currently imports 40 percent of its total requirements. By 2020, it will experience a net shortfall of 50 percent. By 2030 its domestic oil production will start declining rapidly, resulting in a net shortfall of 75-80 percent. India currently imports about 60 percent of its oil requirement; this is projected to increase to about 85 percent by 2010, and about 92 percent by 2030. By 2030, it is estimated that developing Asia's oil demand will exceed that of US and Canada combined, and account for 26 percent of world total, 21 percent of world incremental gas demand and 80% of world coal demand.

An exceedingly grim scenario, if ever there was one, confronts us, considering that as of now the world's hydro-carbon resources are known to be available in very finite figures and in few places! Nevertheless, aspirations for development must be accompanied by ready availability of sufficient energy resources to meet such vaulting ambitions in the global South. How can industrially aspiring but densely populous Asia, particularly the teeming billion plus in South Asia, seize upon this opportune moment a la Gleaneagles, and prepare for the coming dialogue (slated for November 2005)?

South Asia as a whole, alone is host to 23 percent of global population, 39 percent of global poor, as well as the largest absolute number of people living below the poverty line (over 400 million by last count), but accounts for a paltry 2 percent of global GDP. The region already faces critical shortages of energy and water and a rapid deterioration of the natural environment. In terms of energy resources, India has the highest coal deposits (providing 70 percent of fuel for its present power generation), followed by Pakistan (5 percent of fuel for power generation) and Bangladesh. Natural gas is a potential source for filling part of the energy deficit. Bangladesh may possibly have, according to some estimates, the largest reserves (estimates vary from at least 31 TCF to over 58 TCF, but statistics of proven reserves are fiercely contested and highly politicised domestically); India is estimated to have 50 TCF and Pakistan 25 TCF. If these optimistic estimates are eventually proven to be correct, the entire region's cumulative reserves may well be able to meet its demands for the next 40-50 years, provided they are adequately and effectively harnessed -- but that still remains very much in the realm of speculation, and the bickering domestic and regional politics is likely to continue to prevent this buried potential of such assumptions from any meaningful translation into reality.

Additionally, let us not lose sight of the fact that all these conventional hydrocarbon-based sources would still continue contributing, in exponentially increasing measures, to the current ongoing process of adding more GHGs to the global atmosphere, with consequences yet unknown, but largely thought to be fearful. Should South Asia, with its teeming millions and densely packed population (with Bangladesh now declared to be the most densely populated country in the world) be fearful of climate change and environmental degradation and act now to face these challenges? Or should we simply bury our heads in the sand, and ignore the phenomena of retreating glaciers in the Himalayas and recurring but devastating floods of recent years in the plains as acts of God beyond man's control? I am not sure that God, by whatever name we chose to address Him in our diverse region, would be too pleased at our ascribing all blame to Him for the misdeeds of our making.

South Asia is an important contributor of GHG emissions despite comparatively extremely low economic activity, and its overall share of global CO2 will increase exponentially as its various ambitious industrialisation and development schemes are progressively realised. In the meantime, due to non-availability of alternative fuel sources for meeting with the demands of everyday existence, increasing deforestation has been taking place over the last century, and no doubt will continue to take place further in the present century as well, resulting in progressively increasing environmental degradation. This has already had seriously negative spillover effects in other areas as well -- increasing soil erosion during times of heavy floods (a regular feature), and increasing siltation of riverbeds which in turn further exacerbate flooding. Overall, this results in environmental diversity being increasingly at stake (South Asia is home to 5 percent of the world's flora and fauna).

Considering India alone, it is already the fifth largest economy in the world, and is widely expected to become one of the fastest growing economies in the next two decades. However, in this growth spurt, while it is expected to be registering a 5.8 percent average annual energy consumption increase annually, its domestic energy production rate is anticipated to grow by only 2.33 percent a year. It has a current energy deficit of around 100,000 MW -- which will deteriorate further in the years and decades ahead. In 1999 India imported about 2/3 of its crude oil requirements, and was a net importer of coal. By 2020, its demand for commercial energy is likely to increase by 2.5 times over current levels, with highest growth rate of energy consumption predicted by 2010. Closing the gap with nuclear energy is a viably clean (relatively speaking) option -- India already generates 2860 MW through such means. While further development of this sector is likely to be stymied not only by fears of further nuclear expansion in the region further exacerbating the vitiated regional politics -- although the agreement between the United States and India recently does make this possibility more feasible -- the real problem of nuclear waste disposal in a heavily populated region with sparse expanses of uninhabited land would be the real challenge to this option. Looking at the heated debate raging within the United States on the proposed move of all nuclear waste to the federally owned Yucca Mountain repository in sparsely populated Nevada, one may expect very robust environmentalists in India as likely to try their level best at foreclosing any meaningful expansion of this sector.

However, where a dramatic breakthrough could be achieved, and realistically so, is in developing and bringing onstream the region's hydropower potentials -- estimated to be in excess of 200,000 MW. At present, the region has 31,826 MW installed capacity and actual utilization of only about 13.2 MW -- so the region overall harbours an additional 180,000 MW or more of feasible but untapped potential hydel power. South Asia has some of the world's largest river systems in the world. At the same time, ironically, vast areas served by these same rivers are plagued by drought and aridity during the dry season and floods during monsoons, and potable water is an increasingly rare and precious commodity -- all these factors impact adversely on the quality of life in urban living as well. In short, a crisis is foreseen confronting the region's growing population in this century.

Given the current concern and debate on increasing global energy consumption and global warming among governments and peoples of most of the industrialized countries, it would be pertinent to ponder whether the G-8, and the global South (particularly South Asia), will be able to think "outside the box" in addressing the thorny issues of increasing energy consumption and growing demand on finite (and fungible and diminishing) hydro-carbon resources by these awakening Asian giants and the consequences for global warming.

A. Tariq Karim is a career diplomat who retired as Bangladesh's Ambassador to the United States in 2002. He is currently Senior Advisor in the IRIS Center of the University of Maryland.