Constitutional dilemma in Thailand
Actually, my fascination for Thailand started many years ago, when as a young man I saw Walter Lang's splendid 1956 movie The King I, in which Yul Brynner brilliantly played the part of Siam's far-sighted king who was trying to cope with the conflicts of Siamese and European cultures.
Since then, I have met many Thais in Europe, who confirmed my earlier impressions of Thais being an essentially friendly and peace-loving people. So a few weeks ago, after a long flight from Madrid, when I arrived in Bangkok to visit the country it came as a shock to me to find its bustling streets filled with thousands of noisy flag-waving demonstrators.
After I got over the initial shock, I realised that despite the presence of so many banner carrying protesters, there were not many policemen around and that there was hardly any violence. Upon enquiry, I was told that they were protesting against their government.
After weeks of ever- larger street protests in Bangkok and elsewhere by hundreds of thousands of students, members of labour unions and the urban middle class against the democratically elected government of Thailand, Mr. Thaksin, the prime minister decided to call a snap election on April 2.
The opposition parties boycotted the election, alleging that there was not enough time to prepare them for it. In comparison with 19 million votes won in 2005, this time Mr. Thaksin won approximately 16 million out of 28 million votes cast. Mr. Thaksin, who had considered the election as a referendum on him had announced earlier that he would resign if he got less than 50% of the votes.
Having won approximately 57% votes, Mr. Thaksin felt that the electorate had renewed his mandate therefore, he should continue as the prime minister. The opposition promised more street demonstrations and strikes. Until the election, despite the huge rallies and virtual shutdown of government offices, there had been very little violence. However, the country had reached a political stalemate and everybody feared that if the stalemate were to continue, there would be large-scale violence.
The Thais are an essentially conservative people and King Bhumibol is the much-loved and revered monarch of Thailand. He takes his role as a constitutional monarch seriously. Although the court keeps a careful watch over everything that goes on in the country, the king maintains a rigorous distance from day-to-day political affairs.
Until now, only on very special occasions has he intervened in politics. However, his interventions have always been decisive. On April 4, the king invited Mr. Thaksin to have "a special audience" with him. The deliberations of such meetings are secret. Nevertheless, the message was clear; the king did not want the political stalemate to continue.
After the meeting, Mr. Thaksin went on the television and announced with tears in his eyes that he would step aside. At the time of writing this letter, it is not clear as to what is going to happen now. Most probably, a caretaker government will run the country until new elections are held. This affair -- months of street demonstrations and then Mr. Thaksin's decision to step aside -- has brought to light a dilemma:
If street demonstrations are used to force a democratically elected prime minister out of office, will it not lead to a diminished democracy? On the other hand, if an elected prime minister manipulates the constitutional mechanisms to concentrate personal power and amass wealth by unlawful means, how can the people get rid of him peacefully?
A constitutional government should provide stability for a smooth transfer of power, be adaptable to changes, must have checks and balances and be accountable for its decisions and actions. On the domestic front, during his five years in office, Mr. Thaksin was quite successful in maintaining peace and stability except in the south.
He pushed through a number of economic measures, which alleviated poverty in rural areas and at the same time helped the industrial sector to grow significantly. However, in order to project himself as a strong national leader, he tuned himself into a populist authoritarian politician. He violated the checks and balances provisions of the constitution by usurping power and intimidating the opposition, by employing his cronies in key government positions and using the state-owned media and the media companies he had personally acquired, as his personal propaganda machine.
In an open letter to King Bhumibol, Sondhi, the highly respected newspaper publisher summarised the situation: "The prime minister has absolute power. He can decide everything on his own. He does not listen to Thai people who own this country."
Mr. Thaksin has also seriously violated human rights in the south. His iron-fisted response to demands for autonomy in the three Muslim majority Malay provinces has resulted in the massacre of thousands of Muslims. This territory was annexed by Thailand in 1902. Thaksin's policy has upset the peaceful co-existence of the Buddhist and Muslim communities in the country and triggered angry reactions from across the Muslim world.
However, what really brought him down was corruption. According to a recent statement issued by the auditor general of Thailand, "making corruption legal" has been the Thaksin administration's main achievement. To avoid conflict of interest, the 1997 constitution specifically barred all political office holders from owning or operating businesses.
It is alleged that using insider knowledge and his political position, he has amassed an immense fortune. The recent 1.9 billion dollar tax-free Shin-Themasek transaction with the government of Singapore in the sensitive telecommunications sector was the last straw that broke the camel's back. It outraged the public and triggered massive demonstrations against him in Bangkok and elsewhere.
I think a smooth transfer of power is an essential characteristic of a mature democracy. The thought of removing a corrupt political leader with the help of street demonstrations disturbs me because it may set dangerous precedents. In a democracy, where the constitutional mechanisms for checks and balances function properly, street demonstrations are unnecessary.
However, if these mechanisms are hijacked by a corrupt prime minister to serve his own goals, the people may have no other choice but to resort to street demonstrations to remove him. The Thai society is an extraordinarily resilient one. One hopes that the Thaksin affair will help reinforce its democratic institutions by building extra safeguards against abuse of power so that the constitutional rule can survive without the intervention of the so-called "people power."