The failure of military government

By Rounaq Jahan
13 March 2006, 18:00 PM
Book ReviewWe've Learnt Nothing from History Pakistan: Politics and Military PowerM Asghar KhanOxford University Press, 2005
M. Asghar Khan's book, which carries a rather depressing title: "We've Learnt Nothing from History," is a fascinating account of the author's personal recollections of political events and conversations with key leaders in Pakistan over the last half a century. It is a refreshingly frank account often told with a lot of humour. I consider this book as a must read for all students of both Pakistan and Bangladesh politics. Though it primarily focuses on Pakistan politics, many trends described in the book are equally applicable to Bangladesh. Asghar Khan demonstrates how rulers in Pakistan have repeatedly failed to learn from history. I am sure after reading the book students of Bangladesh politics will be tempted to draw similar conclusions about our own rulers, both military as well as civilian.

The book narrates many personal experiences and conversations which will serve as a valuable primary source for scholars researching Pakistan politics. I believe we need many more such personal accounts by people who have been privileged to witness historical events or have had access to confidential information that throws light on dark episodes of our history and politics.

Of course, there is always a risk with personal accounts. These are written from the perspectives of individuals concerned. They can also be self-serving and can tell partial truth or even lies. Unfortunately in Bangladesh we have seen repeated such attempts to misrepresent history by people who claim to be witnesses to historical events. But despite such risks, personal accounts and memoirs are always a valuable primary source. A good researcher should be able to check facts and decide what can and what cannot be used as a source of information.

Though the title of the book is depressing, it is sadly apt. The author persuasively demonstrates how repeated interventions by the military in the country's politics thwarted development of democratic institutions and norms in Pakistan. Each time the military took power, the results were disastrous for the nation. Every military ruler assumed power in the name of "saving" Pakistan. Each promised to "establish" democracy. But each regime pushed the country further in the path of disintegration. Chances of democracy taking root became even more remote with each military intervention. Successive regimesmilitary and civilianpursued the same failed policies and made the same old mistakes. Readers of the book will easily concur with the author that ruling elites, military as well as political, have not learnt anything from Pakistan's six decades of history since its birth in 1947.

Asghar Khan argues that the military is incapable of fostering democracy or even functioning as a government responsive to citizens needs, particularly those of the poor, because the military institution is by definition not accountable to people. He narrates an interesting incident when a junior officer behaved insolently with the deposed president Iskander Mirza. He writes:

"The conduct of this officer typified the dangers inherent in the involvement of the armed forces in politics. When power is wielded by the defence services, it is ultimately exercised by people who both by experience and by temperament are least suited for this role. Since they are not responsible to the people, their arrogance finds expression in ways that are more harmful than the one typified by the ill manners of the young officer at Mauripur airfield on that October morning." (p. 16)

Asghar Khan narrates many such incidences of the military's arrogance and misguided policies. He underscores the futility of the pursuit of military actions by military regimes when the situation on the ground demands a political solution. He cites Pakistani rulers brutal military actions in Bangladesh and Baluchistan as prime examples of such arrogance and folly.

Of course the military rulers have been aided and abetted by equally arrogant and power-hungry politicians such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Asghar Khan narrates a conversation with Yahya Khan who said that Bhutto had advised him (Yahya) that "East Pakistan is no problem. We will have to kill some 20,000 people there and all will be well." (p. 36)

Asghar Khan also reports on lack of resistance and even pro-active undemocratic advice offered to military rulers by influential people who are supposed to uphold democratic principles. For example, Chief Justice Munir told Ayub Khan that a Constitution could be approved by "public acclaim" in meetings organized in different cities of Pakistan by the military regime (pp. 12-13).

I found Asghar Khan's detailed description of the role of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in politics to be the most illuminating chapter. We generally hear rumours about ISI involvement without much empirical evidence to support such allegations. In this book Asghar Khan has devoted a whole chapter (pp. 195-201) describing how ISI's role has changed over the years from its origin in the late 1950s as an intelligence coordination agency to "a system of political interference" in the 1970s and 1980s. He cites examples of ISI support in the formation as well as break up of political parties and alliances; manipulation of election results; distribution of funds to politicians; aid to religions groups within Pakistan; and training of mujahideens that ultimately led to Taliban control of Afghanistan. The most interesting exposure of ISI's role was the suo moto case Asghar Khan brought in the Pakistan Supreme Court in 1996 detailing the illegal activities of the agency, particularly its disbursement of funds to various political leaders (pp. 199-200). The case had three or four hearings and has been in cold storage since 1999.

A pertinent question here is how can ISI continue to engage in such illegal activities when its involvement is open public knowledge? After all the newspapers have published the list of people who received ISI funds. Then why is there no punishment either for the ISI or for the people receiving funds? Asghar Khan provides a partial answer to these question? He observes:

"It is a measure of the lack of political sense of the Pakistani public that they continue to bring these people back to the assemblies whenever national elections are held. Old habits die hard and the political parties and their leadership, whatever their public stand, look towards the armed forces to help them come to power. It has become the norm in Pakistan for political parties when in opposition to establish contact with GHQ or the ISI and conspire to bring down the elected government. If this remains so, the ISI will undoubtedly continue to be used for political manipulation." (pp. 198-199).

The information and analysis on the ISI's role provided by Asghar Khan led me to ponder as to why we do not yet have such exposures on the Bangladesh intelligence services. After all, for years we have heard allegations about NSI and DGFI involvement in our politics. Yet no researcher or the media has attempted to collect and publish empirical evidence. This is a serious gap in our knowledge and understanding of politics. Involvement of intelligence services is a cancer in politics which needs to be clearly identified and eliminated. We need first hand accounts like Asghar Khan's book. We need more evidence-based research on the involvement of intelligence services in our politics.

Asghar Khan's life long commitment to and struggle for the achievement of democracy, human rights and social justice come through clearly as one reads the book. One principle he repeatedly emphasizes is that civil and military officials are under no obligation to follow illegal or immoral orders given by their superiors. He refers to the Nuremberg trials after the Second World War when Nazi war criminals were held accountable even though they tried to plead that they carried out orders of superiors. He cites example from his own life when he refused to follow the order of his superior military commander to destroy a caravan carrying women and children. Chapter 5 of the book, titled "The Guardians of the Law" contains copies of various letters he wrote at different periods to Inspector Generals (IG) of Police and Chief Secretaries, reprimanding them for various unconstitutional and illegal actions committed at the dictates of "immoral and repressive" regimes. In one letter written to IG Police in 1976 he states:

"[S]uch unlawful acts on the part of police officers can only push the country further towards anarchy and chaos. Those who are party to this are undoubtedly guilty of a crime against Pakistan and its people." (p. 89).

Again, this chapter of the book will remind readers in Bangladesh of similar unlawful acts committed by our police, civil administration and military under the order of their superiors. Asghar Khan's insistence on protection of human rights and his description of various incidences of violation of his constitutional rights underscore the importance of establishing rule of law as the primary function of a modern state.

Though Asghar Khan has resisted Bhutto's autocratic actions and personally suffered imprisonment and harassment as a consequence, he is fair in his assessment of Bhutto. For example, he credits Bhutto for some of his economic policies such as nationalization of industries and the Five Marla Scheme in agriculture. He writes that "the working classes were satisfied that the government was working for their uplift and betterment. They acquired a sense of importance and a feeling of security that they had not hitherto experienced" (p. 64). This kind of generosity in recognizing good acts of opponents is rare in our parts of the world.

Many of Asghar Khan's ideas and positions are visionary. He envisions a local government system (pp. 161-2) that will free Pakistan from what he calls the "shackles of an all powerful bureaucracy." He proposes elected governments at village, halqa, district and provincial levels, with control of their staff and operations. He is opposed to Pakistan's acquision of nuclear weapons because he considers this to be an unwise military strategy (pp. 243-44). He argues that it increases the chances of India launching a nuclear first strike. He is also opposed to increasing budget for the armed forces and weapons. Instead he recommends increased investment in human development and social services such as education, health, sanitation and clean water. He is in favour of a near independent status for Kashmir. Indeed, the book is full of many enlightened ideas and policies, which if implemented, would have augured well for Pakistan and South Asia.

Asghar Khan is equally forthright in rejecting use of religion to advance political gains. He argues that the military regimes like that of Ziaul Huq cannot call themselves Islamic because under their policies the gaps between the rich and the poor have widened. Asghar Khan believes that Islam stands for social justice, and regimes that do not promote social justice cannot be called Islamic.

Of course, a good book generates many questions. This book is no exception. Many questions came to my mind as I read the book. Here I will focus on only three. First, Asghar Khan writes that the ruling class of West Pakistan considered East Pakistan to be an "encumbrance and conditioned itself to believe that Pakistan would do better without its eastern wing" (p. 9). But if that was the case, then why did the ruling class not agree to part amicably with us? What was the need to unleash the act of genocide?

Second, Asghar Khan does not fully explain what motivated him to enter politics via a route different from that of other military leaders in Pakistan. After all, he spent a life time in Pakistan military establishment. What led him, then, to oppose his former colleagues: Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan? Why did he decide to champion democracy, human rights, and social justice?

Third, why are leaders such as Asghar Khan, who practice principled politics, not able to mobilize enough popular support to win electoral majorities? Why do people vote for parties that are led by corrupt politicians? What are the constraints of the existing electoral processes that work against clean parties and leaders?

Asghar Khan clearly is not worried about not winning electoral majority or being a politician like the others. He is more interested in telling the truth as he sees it and following his principles and conscience. Surprisingly, however, the book does not have a moralistic, preaching style. Instead it is written simply with a lot of anecdotes some quite amusing, that make it very clear how Pakistani rulers repeatedly took unlawful and immoral actions that ruined successive regime and pushed the ordinary citizens into more and more hardship. The author deserves our congratulations for a highly readable and lucid account of Pakistani politics. Hopefully, after reading this book, our rulers will start learning some lessons from history.

Rounaq Jahan is Senior Research Scholar and Adjunct Professor, International Affairs, Columbia University, New York.