Free elections can end corruption
They formed hodge-podge political parties, drawing self-seeking leaders and activists of all hues, and promoted cronyism, leading to the rise of a class of loan defaulters and tycoons, and, thus, they laid the foundation of politico-business corruption nexus. Elections under them were exercises in foregone conclusion. Irrespective of people's participation, they were assured of a massive mandate.
General Ershad, in the face of unprecedented agitations for people's democratic rights, relinquished power in 1990 to a caretaker government which was formed on the basis of consensus of opposition political parties with the mandate to conduct a free and fair election.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. The BNP formed the government in 1991, but it could not keep its hands off from large-scale electoral irregularities in the March 1994 Magura by-election. The democratically elected BNP government, like its autocratic predecessor, lost trust. This sparked nation-wide political unrest and the demand for incorporation of a provision for a neutral caretaker government in the constitution for holding free and fair election and for orderly and peaceful transfer of power.
In February 1996 BNP organised a fraudulent election in a voter-less poll amid non-participation of AL. The new government that it formed lasted only long enough to enact an amendment to the constitution providing for a CTG for holding election at the expiry/termination of tenure of each elected government.
The experience of BNP government formed after February 1996 election and recent experiences in Thailand and Ukraine show that the results of elections boycotted by a major opposition party, or rigged ones, do not help in forming stable and lasting governments.
On the other hand, the immediate past AL and present BNP government's cases demonstrate that no amount of scheming and street agitation can dislodge a government if it is formed on the basis of a credible election.
In 1991 and 2001, BNP formed the government, winning in largely fair and free elections. Ironically, once saddled in power, both times, it embarked on election engineering for perpetuating its rule. Its intransigence regarding CTG and holding of a voter-less election, boycotted by AL, paved the way for its exit from power in 1996. Again, after coming to power in 2001, it has been plotting a scheme for returning to power in 2007 through an engineered fraudulent election.
-- First, the retirement age of Supreme Court Judges was raised from 65 to 67 years, which was widely perceived as a clever move to allow a BNP loyalist former Chief Justice to become CTG chief during 2007 election.
-- Second, a President was removed from office when he tried to uphold the neutral image of his high office and another apparently escaped removal in the face of hue and cry of the media and the opposition.
--Third, an Election Commission was constituted with persons whose neutrality is doubtful. The CEC Justice MA Aziz and the other members are overtly partisan. The AL and other opposition parties say that no credible election is possible under their supervision.
-- Fourth, the government politicised the entire administration, appointing party loyalists to every key position. Recently, two senior-most Secretaries, considered to be somewhat neutral, were first retired and then appointed as ambassadors, apparently to remove them from the line of promotion for becoming Cabinet and Principal Secretary during the next CTG.
In a round-table organised by the daily Prothom Alo, Shushashoner Jonney Nagarik (Shujan) and The Daily Star held on July 1, civil society members and legal experts emphasised the separation of the EC Secretariat from the PMO, state funding for election, introduction of voter ID card, transparent ballot box and electronic voting system to ensure free and fair election. A neutral Election Commission, a flawless voter list and transparent electoral procedures are sine qua non for ensuring fairness in election.
Impartiality of the administration under the president, and a CTG admired and trusted by all political parties, would make the election results unquestionable. However, while these measures are necessary for holding a credible election they are not sufficient to free electioneering from the evil influence of big money, hoodlums, and goons.
Bangladesh constitution provided that its: "Parliament shall consist of three hundred members to be elected in accordance with law from single territorial constituencies by direct election." The provision of "single territorial constituencies" has made the use of money, and concomitant muscle power the deciding factors for a winning strategy in electoral contests.
In the last general election Awami League bagged 42 percent of the votes but won only 58 seats. BNP-led alliance, with 5 percent more votes, captured more than two-thirds of the seats, which clearly shows what a difference money and concomitant muscle power can make in elections under the present electoral system.
Since single seat constituencies do not ensure equal representation of the voters, in many countries proportional representation or a mix of the two is followed. In nation-wide voting for proportional representation, candidates will lose enthusiasm in investing money as victory would be much less certain. Further, as the MPs would not represent any particular area exclusively, the position from a social and administrative perspective would be far less alluring.
However, voter participation may be lukewarm in nation-wide electoral process. A compromise may be found in "multiple seat" constituencies of not less than three seats, each coinciding with administrative district/districts. For instance, 13 seats of Dhaka district may form one constituency and three hill districts -- Khagrachhari, Rangamati and Bandarban -- together would form another constituency of 3 seats only. A political party would field a maximum of 13 candidates in Dhaka and 3 in Khagrachhari, Rangamati and Bandarban constituency.
If Party X gets 54 per cent votes in Dhaka the first 7 candidates of its list of 13 would be declared elected. Party Y receiving 33 percent votes will get 4 seats. An independent candidate receiving approximately 7 per cent votes would also be a winner. In these "multiple seat" constituencies, the election is more likely to be fought and won on the basis of a party's ideology, program and track record rather than how much money and how many hoodlums a candidate employs in campaigning.
Resource poor political ideologues, currently marginalised in the race for party nominations, would possibly regain lost ground from business tycoons. However, in the changed political scenario, smaller parties may emerge big power brokers if no single party wins a majority.
In developed countries, local governments play a dominant role in the administration and delivery of essential public services. The role of legislators in those countries is primarily limited to enactment of laws. Bangladesh constitution also vested in its parliament only "the legislative powers of the Republic."
Further, it provided that local governments would have various executive functions. The BNP before 2001 election pledged reintroduction of upazilla system it abolished in its previous term. However, once in power, apprehending conflicts between its MPs and local upazilla chairmen, it preferred not to implement the law that the previous AL government had enacted in 1998 providing for 3-tier local government system including upa-zilla. If MPs are elected from "multiple seat" constituencies, the scope of their meddling in local government affairs would cease and law making would become their principal preoccupation.
The parliament should have members drawn from various segments of the society, and professional groups and interests, with deep-rooted commitment for national development and welfare of the masses. Therefore, to facilitate broad-spectrum participation, laws should be enacted to finance election costs from the exchequer, as well as for campaign fund raising from the public. Political parties and candidates may be allowed to receive campaign contributions.
However, there should be an upper limit to the amount a party or a politician may accept as contribution from any company or individual. These contributions may also be made tax deductible. Procedures for maintaining proper accounts, auditing of campaign funds and return of the unspent balance to the exchequer when a politician retires or dies, or when a political party winds up, should also be there in the law.
Replacing "single seat" constituencies with "multiple seat" ones would free the electoral system form the evil influences of money, hoodlums and goons as well the local government affairs from the clutches of MPs. Enactment of laws for campaign fund raising would facilitate participation of political ideologues committed to people's welfare and brighten their chances of becoming MPs rather than the business tycoons driven by profit motive for personal aggrandisement.
Weaning of political corruption would make combating it in various government departments and agencies basically a matter of reforming certain rules and procedures and making prudent use of information and communication technology (ITC). In every society 1-2 per cent of the population is incorruptible under any circumstance and another 1-2 who are corrupt in all circumstances and the rest generally bend one way or the other in consonance with winds flowing from high places of governmental authority. As a government becomes more corrupt, its functionaries join the bandwagon in greater numbers. The opposite occurs when an honest administration takes its place.
Agencies, such as an effective Anti-Corruption Commission, may act as deterrents, but for rooting out corruption there is no alternative to electing a government with an ideological commitment. It would be possible to pull out the country from the quagmire of corruption only when the "ideology" of service to the people replaces expediency and profit motive as the driving force of the political party vested with the responsibility of its governance.