Iraq adopts new constitution: Delicate road ahead

By Syed Muazzem Ali
7 November 2005, 18:00 PM
Decades later, when historians look at the Iraq War they would surely notice that this unique war began due to gross miscalculations by both sides. Both US and Iraq had misconstrued their reasoning and had misread the opposing side's game plan.

The Bush administration had thought that they would be able to produce some evidence of weapons of mass destructions in Iraq, which by itself would justify their preemptive attack and then they could go ahead with their occupation of Iraq. Nothing has been found despite thorough search during the last three years.

Their second miscalculation was that the Iraqi people would welcome the Americans as liberators and extend their full cooperation in the latter's drive to "democratise" Iraq. They were wrong again. History has shown that after all liberations, people would like to see withdrawal of foreign forces. Furthermore, democratic reform is an indigenous item, which cannot be exported from abroad. The process is a long and complicated one especially in Iraq where they have three distinct communities, namely Shias, Sunnis and Kurds. Any viable democratic structure in Iraq must be based on a fine and delicate balance among the three communities.

On the other hand, Saddam Hussein had thought that despite tough ultimatums, Washington would not be able to launch an attack against him due to lack of support from other Western allies. Furthermore, Russia, China and third world and Muslim countries had opposed the US invasion. He was also influenced by the large-scale anti-war demonstrations in the United States and elsewhere.

Saddam did not understand that after the deadly terrorist attacks of September 11, the public mood had changed drastically in the US and that the Bush administration was going to use it to launch an attack against him as a part of his "war against terror". Interestingly, vast majority of Americans were made to believe that Saddam was involved in the 9/11 attack, though no such link could be proved between the Saddam regime and the Al-Qaeda terrorists.

My western friends are puzzled why Saddam had pretended to have "weapons of mass destructions" when he had none. Well, one has to understand that Saddam is like a school bully, and had survived by using those threats in the past against his opponents at home and abroad. Saddam had fought two disastrous wars against neighboring Iran and Kuwait, had ideological rivalry with Baathist Syria, and tensions with the Royal families in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. At home, his situation was equally vulnerable as he was ruthlessly suppressing the Shia majority and persecuting the Kurds to perpetuate the minority Sunni rule. With so many adversaries at home and abroad, Saddam could not have demonstrated publicly that he does not have any such weapons, thereby making his position vulnerable.

The Washington-led invasion achieved military success within a record time and the whole operation ended so quickly that Bush had proudly come out with "mission accomplished" banner. However, America hardly envisaged formulating any plan to deal with the post-war Iraq, and their Administrators kept on making one blunder after another. The resistance movement became more violent and unfathomable, and Washington started looking for an honourable exit route. It is easy to start a war but difficult to end one.

America has so far lost two thousand soldiers, and thousands have been injured due to on-going resistance war in Iraq. The US public support for the Iraq war has plummeted. Washington was hoping that adoption of the constitution would lead to building a democratic, unified and peaceful Iraq that could survive withdrawal of US and other foreign forces from the country.

The good news for the US is that Iraq has adopted the new constitution; the bad news is that Sunni Arabs had nearly killed it. The official results announced on 25 October, i.e. ten days after the polls, indicate that majority of Iraq's 18 provinces have voted in favour. However, the two predominantly Sunni Arab provinces, Salahaddin and Anbar, rejected it by the crucial two-third majority. If the third Sunni province of Nineveh could also reject the move by the same required margin then the adoption motion would have been defeated. However, they just fell short, as 55 percent voted against the constitution in Nineveh.

The final tally shows that 78 percent Iraqis supported the constitution while 21 percent opposed it. The strongest support came from the Shia dominated areas particularly Basra, Najaf and Kerbala. Likewise, the Kurds overwhelmingly supported the constitution. The constitution drawn up by Shia-Kurdish factions largely ignored the concerns of Sunni Arabs who had earlier boycotted the January poll.

The main Sunni Arab concern is that the newly adopted constitution, by extending high degree of federalism to oil-rich Shias and Kurds, would deprive Sunnis of Central Government's revenue and, thereby, the capital city of Baghdad would only have limited national authority.

The United States Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad brokered last minute deal to partially alleviate the concerns of Sunnis when he made the Shia and the Kurds agree that changes to the constitution could also be made by the Parliament to be elected on December 15.

Since the formation of Iraq on the ruins of Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the Sunni minority has ruled Iraq and dominated all state institutions. It is true that the Sunni dissidents had suffered as much as the opponents of the other two ethnic groups in the hands of Saddam and other tyrants. Nonetheless, the vast majority of Sunnis cannot yet accept Shia rule or are ready to grant autonomy to Kurds. The Sunnis, who constitute a fifth of the population, had been calling the shots under the Saddam rule and are apprehensive that this constitution would only cut them off from the country's oil wealth and make them virtually powerless.

How does the adoption of constitution change the reality on the ground? The optimists believe that the large Sunni turnout for the first time would strengthen Iraq's post-war political institutions, weaken the insurgency and facilitate withdrawal of US and other foreign forces. President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sounded optimistic that the adoption of constitution would push forward the political process in Iraq.

Other experts believe that the failure of the Sunnis to kill the ratification of the Constitution would only further marginalise them. In fact, the last minute assurance by the US Ambassador made some Sunnis go to the polling station but the vast majority of them still voted against it. Sunnis also alleged that the referendum was a "farce" as government forces stole ballot boxes to diminish the size of the negative vote. Unless the Sunnis' concerns are taken into considerations, the sectarian clash between the Shia militia and Sunni guerilla fighters will continue.

How to break the logjam? Well, the first effort should be to promote confidence-building measures between the two communities. Experts believe that the Iraqi Parliament could appoint a Constitutional committee to consider various changes to make it more acceptable to Sunnis. Such a conciliatory move could encourage the Sunnis not to boycott the December 15 elections.

Another major issue is the role of Islam in the newly adopted Iraqi constitution. The present provision states that Islam is the "main source" of legislation and that no state law can contradict Islamic and democratic standards or the essential rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution. But others point out that Shariah law effectively curbs women's rights to property, divorce proceedings and even their evidence in the court of law. Shias support primacy of Islam in the constitution while Sunnis would like to make necessary amendments to protect fundamental rights of all citizens.

Under the circumstances, Washington had to ease its opposition to an Islamic Iraqi state in order to get the constitution adopted. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, however, clarified that Islam would be recognised as the "primary source", not as "the main source", of legislation in the constitution.

Besides these points of contentions, the new constitution aims to establish "a republican, federal, democratic, and pluralist system" with a provision to "respect the rule of law, and reject the policies of aggression, give attention to the rights of women, men and children, and spread the culture of diversity and uproot terrorism." It also "guarantees the Islamic identity and the practice of their ideological practices." For the first time, the Kurdish language has been equated with Arabic as one of the official languages.

The crucial question is whether the dominant Shia community, who have been in the past deprived of their rightful role in the national political scene, and the Kurdish minorities, who have suffered so much, would be willing to make significant amendments in the constitution after the next round of Parliamentary elections in December to get the Sunnis on board. The narrow margin of victory and the large Sunni turnout should encourage them to take a more pragmatic course of action. They have to agree to enter into negotiations to amend the provisions for strengthening the protection of Sunnis, guaranteeing the financial and political integrity of the central government in exchange for their broader autonomy. Likewise, they have to remove the constitutional provisions that subordinate women's rights to clerical decrees.

If there were an agreement on these amendments then it would be necessary to ratify them through another referendum by two-third majority. These rules are meant to create final results acceptable to all three main ethnic and religious groups in Iraq with a view to promoting national unity and constitutional developments.

The occupying power, United States, has to convince both Shias and Kurds that any rigidity on their part would not be in their interest as they would have to face continued civil war and the hostilities of other Sunni neighbours. US recognise that it cannot continue with the present policy of pacifying the Sunni provinces and defend the Kurdish and Shia areas.

The Sunni leadership also has to accept certain ground realities. First of all, they have to recognise that they are a minority and, naturally, in a democratic process they cannot have the monopoly of power, which they had enjoyed in the past. Secondly, they must work collectively with the Shias and Kurds to help the establishment of a strong and stable democratic government, which alone can create necessary condition for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from their country. Thirdly, they have to engage themselves fully in the democratic process and national reconstruction efforts.

On the other hand, if the current unstable condition continues then it only provides justification for continued military presence and further weakening of the central government in Baghdad. This could very well lead to disintegration of Iraq into three states. All parties, therefore, has to show greater flexibility and understanding for the long-term interest of their country.

Syed Muazzem Ali is a former Foreign Secretary.