Making democracy work

House half empty: When was the last time this chamber was full?. PHOTO: STAR

The demand for a politically neutral CTG, elimination of black money and the terror of ruling party activists, and neutrality of EC officials including the EC chairman, are what everyone wants. People with criminal records, loan defaulters, and black money holders belong in prison and must be barred from the election process. If democracy is to be functional these and similar such demands cannot be trampled.

After being ruptured by fifteen-plus years of various military dictatorships and presidential rules, the country started its trials and tribulations with a shaky parliamentary democracy in 1991. Although, three parliamentary elections were held between 1991 and 2001 under the CTG, the nascent democracy is still evolving with the recurrence of antagonistic environment of the period of 1973-75. Intellectuals and political observers at home and abroad have raised eyebrows about the potential demise of democracy in the country.

Professor Adam Przeworski of New York University conducted an extensive study which included every transition to democracy around the globe. The study found that once a country passes $6,000 in per capita GDP it is virtually guaranteed to succeed in its transition to democracy. Countries with per capita GDP between $3,000 and $6,000 have less than a 50-50 chance of continuing as democracies; and those below $3,000 have virtually no chance of survival of a functional democracy. Throughout human history, about 70 democracies which have collapsed over time -- all happened in poorer countries -- whereas as many as 35 democracies prevailed over a span of 1,000 years under more economic affluence. Affluent democracies survived multitudes of problems: wars, riots, scandals, and economic and governmental crises.

Professor Przeworski estimated that the probability that democracy survives increases monotonically with per capita GDP. For example, between 1951 and 1999, the probability that a democracy would fall during any particular year in countries with per capita income under $1,000 is suggests that their expected life is about 11 years. With incomes ranged $1,001 to $3,000, the expected duration is roughly 27 years. For income level between $3,001 and $6,055, the probability is 78 years of expected life. And above $6,055, democracies are expected to last forever.

One might question then: How did democracy survive in the US in the 18th and 19th century when US per capita GDP was well below $3,000, like today's Bangladesh? Perhaps it is not the low income itself that causes a democracy to collapse, but rather the same factors that contribute to income also breaks down democracy. A democratic society in the 19th century that didn't confront those undesirable factors present still would have had -- at least by late 20th century standards -- low per capita GDP.

But it would have had the right blend of cultural elements and other attributes that enormously complemented to foster and sustain a democracy and utilise scientific and technological innovations. In the context of Bangladesh, low per capita GDP of less than $2,500 is not the only problem weakening democratic institutions; all other chronic maladies such as political infighting, lack of rule of law, corruption, and slow adaptation of scientific and technological advances pose a serious threat to democracy.

Another important stigma that stands in the way of realising a full-fledged liberal democracy in Bangladesh is the lack of tradition of democracy in countries with Muslim majority. According to the Freedom House's 2005 annual report of the world's 192 countries, 121 are electoral democracies. However, only 11 of the 47 nations with Muslim majority have democratically elected governments -- thus a non-Islamic country is more than three times likely to be democratic than an Islamic state. However, not all democracies are free countries, where people enjoy a broad range of rights. A few of the countries like Bangladesh are rated partly democratic where corruption, dominance of ruling parties, intimidation of the print media, and sometimes ethnic or religious strife are the norm.

Here is an interesting empirical testing of survivability of democracies based on two competing theories: Theories of Democratic Consolidation (TDC) and Theories of Democratic Honeymoons (TDH). The TDC assert that new democracies are more vulnerable to breakdown, while the TDH claim that new democracies are less vulnerable to breakdown. The study attempted these seeming contradictory hypotheses by using a data set that included all democracies from 1951 to 1995. Using both continuous and discrete specifications of a honeymoon period, the study tested whether new democracies experience an absolute honeymoon (whether newness in itself makes them less prone to breakdown) or a relative honeymoon (where newness insulates them from the effect of poor economic performance). The results implied that there was a short-lived absolute honeymoon, but that new democracies were actually more vulnerable to effects of low per capita GDP prior to their third legislative election.

A vast majority of the countries in the world that have low per capita GDP also have their populations lack the values and abilities and customs needed to make liberal democracy or even semi-liberal democracy function. In Bangladesh, we are self-deceiving and always try to avoid self criticism and self evaluations, worse yet, we are intolerant to objective criticism by the media and intellectual discourse about our shortcomings. Being rational and tolerant is not in our nature and traditions. We win a hard fought election and then hunt down our opponents instead of being generous to them for making the election competitive. After failing to win a majority in the parliament to form a government, we cannot accept being a minority party. Our disagreement with the ruling party results in hartals and violent protests. The ruling party resorts to lathi charge and tear gas explosion instead of debate. The country has virtually been under one party system for the last four years regardless of which party is at fault. This is autocracy in the guise of democracy.

Before rejecting the CTG reform proposals, the BNP must revisit the factors that culminated with its debacle after the Magura by-election on March 20, 1994. The long spell of hartals that followed paralysed all economic activities, and in an effort to hold on to power the ruling BNP organised a make-believe national election only to manipulate a landslide victory by large scale vote rigging in an overwhelming voter boycotted poll. The non-stop street agitations at home and diplomatic embarrassments abroad brought the government to its knees to transfer power to a CTG.

The constitution was amended for a system of CTG to hold free and fair election within 90 days. Although the election that followed which brought AL to power was acclaimed as free and fair, the BNP minority resorted to hartals and street protests on flimsy grounds. Non-stop hartal calls by BNP from February 9 to 11, February 23 to 25, 1999, and many subsequent hartals and street agitations destroyed nearly a dozen lives and tens of millions worth of property and economic output. The next general election was held in October 2001 in which the BNP-led alliance won two-third majority in the parliament. The AL could not take the loss with grace and humility and resorted to pay back what BNP did four years ago to AL, and the country is back to political deadlock.

In 1998, Western diplomats and Bangladesh business organisations made several demands for compromises by all parties to avoid protest strikes. Although the economy was opened for FDI in the early 1990s, there has been little or no gains in foreign financial capital. Watching the deteriorating political and economic situation from the sidelines, the EU issued warning in March 1999 that "lack of respect for elementary principles of democratic governance" was seriously hampering development prospects. The same warnings are ringing once again from the same countries and institutions except the warnings are louder and more ominous. The former US ambassador Mr. Harry Thomas even raised the spectre of an alternative if the current confrontational politics continues unresolved.

With low per capita income, lack of democratic values and traditions as the hallmark of a Muslim country, coupled with other age-old endemic problems, we all must work relentlessly as a cohesive force to defy and defeat all the negatives that threaten our democracy. Caretaker government, although home grown, is a unique feature in our democracy, which came into being because of distrust of the ruling party's election rigging maneuverings in the past.

A democracy that evolves within the unique economic, religious, and cultural complexities of a nation will be an everlasting democracy. As democracy itself evolves through various transitional stages so would the institution of the caretaker government and the election commission need reform. In the process, what looks workable today may need further refinement along the way as new ideas evolve. This underscores exactly what democracy is all about.

The authors are, respectively, Professor of Economics, Eastern Michigan University and former Secretary to the government of Bangladesh.