Management of 1998 flood: An experience to emulate

The all-engulfing flood of 1998.Photo: Courtesy DRIK

Flood: 1998
Amid flood situation deteriorating with maddening unpredictability and the weather prophets failing to make any definite prognosis, the first meeting of the National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) was held with the PM in the chair on 16 July,1998. As more and more areas were engulfed, the marooned people needed food, shelter, medicines, clothes, drinking water and what not? (even dry match box and candle). Cattle were swept away and 53 of country's 64 districts were crying for succour. In retrospect, when the total flood management of 1998 is looked through an analytical prism today, four glowing bands appear prominent. They are: a) Relief operation; b) Post flood rehabilitation programme; c) Resource mobilisation and d) Coordination, supervision and monitoring.

Relief operation
Identification of genuinely distressed families, making food stocks available in local godowns with arrangements for quick replenishments from CSDs/silos, providing medicines, ORS, water purifying tablets and guarding against misappropriation of relief materials were the foremost tasks that had to be addressed with utmost care, firmness and precision. Armed Forces Division (AFD) was integrated in the operation and normal channel of inter-ministerial communication was short-circuited at times to facilitate prompt action. NGOs were persuaded to mobilise their resources to augment government's relief effort. (This year, somehow, NGOs' involvement appears to be less pronounced). Partisan politics took the back seat and the local administration was advised to involve the local people irrespective of their political leanings. Nearly 2800 shelter centers were operating and more than 4000 medical teams worked ceaselessly. The supply of relief materials from friendly countries was so synchronised that life saving drugs and water purifying tablets were airlifted first on priority basis.

Rehabilitation
A massive rehabilitation programme was mounted to salvage the economy derailed by the flood. VGF programme covered 4.2 million families under which nearly 20 million people were fed for long seven months and in some areas even up to nine months. This had not only saved lives of millions but also averted a mass exodus of rural population to the capital. Rehabilitation programmes were drawn in health, agriculture, fisheries and livestock, communication, water and irrigation sectors.

Resource mobilisation
Post flood rehabilitation programme required resources that far exceeded the budgetary allocations and ADP provisions for the fiscal. To meet the yawning gap between the demand and targeted domestic production the government imported 4.62 million tons of foodgrains. Private sector was also involved in import and sale of foodgrains and in fact, 62 per cent of the total import was made by the private sector(2.88m.mt). Besides, the government provided Tk.32,000 million agricultural loan to be disbursed through banking channel. Since the government had invoked assistance from the international community well ahead and the response was encouraging, restructuring of country's economic, monetary and fiscal measures could quickly be accomplished. Top priority was assigned to agriculture, communication, fisheries and livestock and rebuilding of basic infrastructure.

Coordination -- the crux of management
An effective and functional coordination mechanism was a sine-qua-non for any operation of this magnitude. There was not only need for inter-ministerial and inter agency coordination within the government but the coordination exercise had to embrace the NGOs and international agencies who played pivotal role in the total chain of activities.

In a prompt move, a central Cell was set up at the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) which was primarily run by the personal staff of the PM, few officers drawn from the PMO and representatives of the AFD. The Cell would brief the PM on day to day situation. It was carefully run in a manner that it did not intervene directly with the normal functioning of formal government channels or committees at various levels. It was in effect, supervision and monitoring from a distance without sitting on the shoulders of formal bodies. The bottlenecks were identified and prompt actions were taken to remove those snags. Almost everyday, the district administrations were contacted over telephone to know the ground realities there. Few examples will elaborate the working mechanism of the cell.

Towards the beginning, there were some reports of pilferage the reason being that the carrying cost had to be met by selling a portion of the foodgrains. When this was brought to the notice of the PM she instantly changed the system and allocated money from her own relief fund to be used as carrying costs. This proved to be an effective deterrent to relief misappropriation. The cell drew up a nationwide scheme to replenish the local food godowns immediately and the food department was asked to implement and monitor the replenishment process so that at least 15 days' revolving stock was made available at each lowest level godown. For any impasse, they would contact the Cell immediately. Similar mechanism was also drawn for medicine, ORS, water-purifying tablet, C.I. Sheet and sundry others. There were occasions when the Cell would ask the local administration to deliver urgent relief materials from government godowns/ storage facilities pending arrival of D.O. The Cell would take responsibility for this act of irregularity. The people in the central Cell worked with zeal and confidence and did not procrastinate actions for time consuming bureaucratic formalities. It was the immediate intervention by the PMO that ensured procurement of medicine and water purifying tablets on a priority basis and this move was prompted by a news report in media.

The PM would visit flood affected areas almost everyday although some visits had to be cancelled or rescheduled for inclement weather or because of helicopters being unable to land. Her intensive tour gave her clear understanding and first hand impression on the colossus of the flood. She would leave Dhaka in the morning, return in the evening and hold review meetings with various agencies after magreb prayer on the daily situation.

News reports on flood in media were treated with utmost seriousness. The personal staff would scan the newspapers and no news item on corruption, scarcity of materials or instances of administrative lapses or cases of irresponsibility would go unattended. The man at the job would receive a telephone call from somebody in the PMO for clarification on the report. Not that all newspaper reports were found credible but many reports helped detect snags which prompted timely intervention of the Cell that saved the programme.

By August 1998 the full-blown flood was unleashing havoc with severe ferocity. Foreign media reports expressed concern that millions might die of starvation, disease and malnutrition. But the PM in her usual gusto loudly declared that not a single person would be allowed to die on any of these counts.

The government's decision to import four million mt of foodgrains was one thing and reaching the food to the needy was different. It was an uphill task. Long chain of activities were involved in the process. Finalisation of purchase contracts, opening of LC, availability of vessels, timely shipment, unloading at sea and land ports, port congestions and last but by far not the least, transporting the food grains to the deep interior were few major steps that demanded close monitoring. A cleavage at any point would jeopardize the total process. Special meetings were held separately with Bangladesh Bank, railway, port authority and shipping ministry, NBR and sundry others. BB monitored banking operations keeping close liaison with finance ministry. Ports were made to operate at their optimum efficiency and railway authorities were instructed to mobilise whatever available wagons they had to evacuate the offloaded grains from the ports (land and sea) to destinations.

It was a Herculean task that needed intense coordination and monitoring. The Cell had to maintain accounts of wagons, pinpoint their locations and see that these were returned to the ports immediately after discharging goods at the destination. Through an ingenious mechanism it was possible to say with precision how many wagons were lying at which outlying stations at any point of time either due to oversight of some railway officials or for the shortage of locomotives.

Special feeder service of BIWTC bergs were commissioned to carry export related goods between Narayanganj/Demra and Chittagong/Mongla ports to meet shipment deadlines. Massive import of foodgrains coupled with fall in export (resulting from flood) brought tremendous pressure on country's FE reserves. Policy options were weighed and decisions taken to meet any eventuality. The relief minister spent days together in the affected areas, the agricultural minister visited rural areas to see for herself the condition of farmers and identify pitfalls in the agri-rehabilitation programme and the finance minister kept liaison with donors and oversaw the working of fiscal and monetary measures. Inflationary effect on food items was marginal. The advisor to PM on agricultural affairs sat regularly with people from SPARRSO and allied scientific organisations and scanned the weather satellite data obtained through the courtesy of Japanese GSM satellite and advised the policy planners. The PMO was kept open on Saturdays.

These are only few instances and examples could be multiplied. This aptly demonstrates how a close knit coordination, supervision and monitoring mechanism was brought into operation that kept the juggernaut of disaster management under the grip of the government.

This year quick home work is essential before events slip out of control. Dark cloud looms large and no longer can we afford to sit on the fence knowing well that international agencies, too, suffer from bureaucratic constipation. Water borne diseases are spreading wildly and dengue is a new menace this time. There are reports of shortage of medicines, water purifying tablets and the law and order situation is not at a satisfactory level.

While stressing upon the need for an action oriented, down to earth coordination mechanism, it goes without saying that the apex unit should work from a distance and should not get involved in the day to day activities of ministries, agencies or coordination committees at various levels. The central coordination body should be more of a policy formulating body, a hard task master whose foremost responsibility is to ensure accountability at each tier of administration and getting things done by removing bottlenecks. In 1998, it was a national crisis and obviously country's top office had to assume command and responsibility. It was a gigantic task the success of which would find many authors but failure would point fingers at the top only.

It is now recognised that the management of '98 flood was impressive. It belied the predictions made by foreign media of epidemic, millions of death and a lawlessness resulting from a collapsed post-flood economy. Economic recovery was quick to be recognised and the government's splendid management of a disaster of such magnitude was acclaimed internationally. This had raised the image of Bangladesh as a nation in the eyes of the world.

Now that the country has again been subjected to the scourge of flood, we must be adequately equipped to face the cataclysm. Intelligent people learn from others' experience and we too can draw heavily on the lessons learnt from the experience of 1998 flood. It is no longer treading through an uncharted hostile sea. All the information is available in government offices. Just dig out those files, clean the dusts and see how best can we be benefited from the knowledge and experience buried in the files of that unforgettable year. There is a success story of Bangladesh which is worth emulating.

Ahmad Mahmudur Raza Chowdhury is a former civil servant.