The mistake of militarism

* Achieve its strategic and political goals?

* Embolden, rather than weaken, the support of Damascus and Tehran for Hezbollah?

* Make the two-state solution of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict any closer than before?

* Reveal that there is no winnable war for Israel any more, unlike the 1967 war?

* Weaken or strengthen America's resolve against Iran's nuclear ambitions?

* Reveal that Israel may have become a liability to the US, rather than an asset, in the war on terror?

Peter Wallsten in the The Baltimore Sun, wrote: "The truce that took effectcoming without the destruction of Hezbollah's military threat, and an unclear path to its disarmamentmarks a far less dramatic conclusion than many in the Bush administration had hoped for when the fighting began last month."

Israel invaded Lebanon, with the administration's tacit acquiescence, to destroy a "terrorist organization" and also to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Isn't it ludicrous that the US wants enforcement of 1559 when no other country has patently defied more UNSCRs than Israel, and no country has vetoed more UNSCRs, to protect Israel, than the US?

Following the traits of 1967 and 1982 war, Israel again pursued its strategic goals through militarism, eschewing diplomacy for a destructive display of brute force. But to what avail? Eugene Robinson in The Washington Post wrote: "How can this utterly disproportionate, seemingly indiscriminate carnage be anything but counterproductive?"

In a conventional war, Hezbollah is no match for Israel. However, Hezbollah has two weapons in its favour: first, it has the political will to die fighting Israel; second, the specifics of "victory" for Israel and Hezbollah, in the current round of conflict, are spartanly different.

It's the political will of Hezbollah that is most worrisome for Israel. By brutalizing Lebanon, Israel wanted to break that political resolve. No matter how much they ravage Lebanon, the Israelis cannot win the war, said The Boston Globe editorial: "Hezbollah's roots as a political and religious movement are implanted too deep in Lebanon to be torn up by Israeli bombs."

After the1967 war, Israel occupied Syria's Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, and along with the West Bank and Gaza Strip it fully controlled the entire Mandate of Palestine. However, the military gains did not translate into a political or strategic victory.

Fifteen years later, in 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon hoping to destroy the PLO, redraw the map of the Middle East, and annex the West Bank. Yet again, military victory did not achieve Israel's strategic goals. Twenty-four years later, on August 12, Israel's month long onslaught has not obliterated Hezbollah, it has, instead, raised Hezbollah's stature in the Middle East and in Iran and Syria.

Every war and conflict, involving Israel, since 1967 has been over the issue of Israel's occupation and its refusal to allow Palestinian refugees to return, or even to file claims for lost property. It's an irony that Jewish refugees from Europe, in the 1930s and 1940s, could file claims for lost property, but Israel denies that claim to Palestinians.

Israel, and America's neo-cons would like to see the US engage in as many military theaters in the Muslim countries as possible. But such adventurism is not feasible for several reasons:

* No country, not even the US, possesses an infinite capability to occupy many Muslim countries at one time. The administration is already in the process of downsizing its force presence in Afghanistan by transferring most of its peacekeeping-related jobs to Nato forces.

* The US also lacks the political will to remain as an occupying force in a Muslim country for a prolonged period. The occupation of Iraq, more than Afghanistan, is proving that reality.

* High casualties on the battlefield are unacceptable to the American public while the Islamists are more than willing, it seems, to absorb disproportionately high casualties, and display "the will to endure and prevail."

* Invasion of Iraq has undermined US standing in the region and around the world.

* While the West continues to insist that Iran is behind Hezbollah's kidnapping, no one knows how Iraq's Shiite political parties and militias, who also maintain strong ties with Tehran, will react to an Israeli invasion of Syria or bombing of Iran.

* The hawks refuse to accept that Israel's invasion of Lebanon has produced several counter-productive outcomes none of which favours the bombing, or invasion, of Syria or Iran any time soon, and will only put America in harms way.

* Israel's collective punishment of Lebanon has not only elevated the status of Hezbollah in the Arab world, but has also established that Hezbollah can withstand Israel's counter-attack.

* If Lebanon is not quickly rebuilt, it may degenerate into a lawless place like Afghanistan and Iraq, which is likely to make Hezbollah and al-Qaeda as bed-fellows, although they have delicate theological differences.

* In 1982 Israel failed to convert Lebanon into a client state. The current debacle should convince Israel to negotiate for peace with its neighbours in exchange for occupied territories. While Israel has destroyed the civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, it has also accepted a cease-fire and has already started withdrawing its troops. Israel realized that such an option offers the best possibility of disarming Hezbollah, if at all.

* Israel must have realized also that with its most sophisticated conventional arsenal, fighting Hezbollah was not a "cakewalk." If bombing of Syria and Iran was in the agenda, it had to be aborted anticipating the unimaginable destruction that would have befallen all three countries concerned.

* In the US, critics are now openly questioning whether "Israel is a net asset or liability," wrote Charles Krauthammer in the Washington Post: "By seeking victory on the cheap," through airpower, Prime Minister Olmert has jeopardized America's confidence in Israel as a reliable partner in the war on Islamic extremism."

Olmert admitted "shortcomings" in the 34-day-old war when he faced a stormy Knesset session in the face of devastating poll figures showing a majority of the Israeli public believed that no major goals of the war had been achieved. Benjamin Netanyahu, former PM and now leader of the opposition, declared "there were many failures, failures in identifying the threat, failures in preparing to meet the threat, failures in the management of the war, failures in the management of the home front."

Patrick Buchanan wrote: "Where does this leave us? With Israel's failure to achieve its strategic objectives in Lebanon, and America having failed to attain its strategic objectives in Iraq, Nasrallah emerges triumphant, and Syria and Iran emerge unscathed and gloating."

Dahr Jamail argues: "The societal, economic, and environmental destruction of the war is staggering as well as long-lasting; but it will pale in comparison to the psychological damage that has already been done. Rather than sowing the seeds of a future peace, it's painfully clear to an observer that the seeds of everlasting bloodshed, resentment, and resistance are now sprouting amid the ruins."

Maybe, at long last, Israel is realizing what Dhar Jamil has conjectured. A tribute to that is evident from what Defense Minister Amir Peretz of Israel had to say: "Every war creates an opportunity for a new political process. We must hold a dialogue with Lebanon, and we should create the conditions for dialogue also with Syria."

Dr Abdullah A Dewan is Professor of Economics at Eastern Michigan University.