The Nepalese imbroglio
Last February's Royal coup, a continuation of the monarch's power grab since October 2002, has resulted in incremental decline in the support from the Nepalese people and the international community to the King. Political activists and the students continue to agitate against what they call the autocratic monarchy. Popularity of the monarchyits power primarily based on the army and is unable to deliver either security and economic development to the impoverished peopleis declining. Political parties and civil society are getting more and more convinced that the Royal putsch was more directed at destroying the democratic institutions than fighting the Maoist insurgency.
The attitude of the Palace towards the political parties remains uncompromising, though Nepal Congress President GP Koirala and some other political leaders have been freed from house arrest. The Palace's view about the political parties was reflected in the comment of a former chief of the army that the political parties be declared "anti-national elements." The army, which constitutionally has remained beyond civilian control, is basically a feudal army, its primary function being that of shoring up the monarchy.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. Personality traits of the assassinated King Birendra and those of the present monarch are believed to be different. The late King who was immensely popular had appointed his younger brother Dhirendra (also killed in the 2001 Palace massacre) the point man for secret dealings with the Maoists. This was revealed after the Palace massacre by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the Mikhail Suslov of the Maoist Communist Party.
The army under the present monarch has refused to reciprocate the unilateral ceasefire declared by the Maoists and desired by the people who are tired of the violence which has become the landscape of politics in Nepal. Contrary to the belief of the hardliners in the administration, the ceasefire reportedly reflects the strength and not the weakness of the Maoists, as the vast swath of rural Nepal remains under their control, while the government troops are forced to garrison inside the towns and other urban areas.
The unpopularity of the monarchy can be gauged by the fact that the national convention of Koirala's Nepali Congress held in August-September last year dropped adherence to constitutional monarchy from the party's political program.
In a recent mass meeting held at Bakhtiarpur, Koirala ruled out any possibility of compromise with the King. He warned that if the King "continues to go against the interests of the people, the future of the monarchy will be at stake."
Such pronouncement from the head of a political party known for its social conservatism and desire to maintain socio-economic status quo and himself a former Prime Minister shows the chasm created by the Palace's implacable policy to marginalize the political parties and subvert the democratic process.
It would, however, be fallacious to assume that Koirala (and the Nepali Congress) has opted for republicanism. The 12 point agreement reached between the Maoists and the seven party alliance in Delhi in November vowed to establish "absolute democracy by ending autocratic monarchy." To Koirala, absolute democracy may mean a political construct less than a republic and something akin to ceremonial monarchy.
The current position of the other major political party, United Marxist Leninist Party, led by Madhav Kumar Nepal can be found in one of his policy statements that the "only choice before the people is ceremonial monarchy and a republic" with UML opting for a "democratic republic."
The question of republicanism, the parties agreed in New Delhi, would be decided by an elected constituent assembly the election, to which end the cantonment of the Maoists forces and the government troops during the elections should be supervised by the UN "or any other reliable international" entity.
Though the New Delhi agreement was predictably rejected by the Royal government, it has for the first time committed the Maoists to a multi-party political system, though on the question of Maoists' disarmament, the agreement remains vague.
The reasons behind the Maoists and the seven party alliance to reach an agreement are not difficult to fathom. The Maoists must have realized that total military victory over the Royal Nepalese Army is not possible, and even if it were possible it would have united the rest of Nepalese forces to band against the Maoists. Since the Bolshevik revolution scenario cannot be replicated in Nepal, prudence demanded that the Maoists should form an alliance with the established political parties.
The political parties, on the other hand, fearing total marginalization due to the Palace's refusal to accept their demand of retraction from the politico-military path currently being followed by the Palace, which has usurped their institutional territory, and the Maoists having taken away their political territory, were left with little choice but to join ranks with the Maoists.
Such an alignment, the political parties felt, would force the Palace to seek them out for a compromise. But the New Delhi agreement is not cast in stone. Madhav Kumar Nepal of UML has reportedly refused to jointly work with the Maoists unless they agreed to disarm (about a dozen members of the Politburo of UML opposed any deal with the Maoists). Additionally many constituents of Koirala's Nepali Congress and former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's Nepali Congress (Democratic) may balk at signing on to a republican platform.
The New Delhi agreement appears to reflect a shift away from the policy of "twin pillars"constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy being essential for stability in Nepal. That the Delhi meeting could not have taken place without Indian acquiescence, if not blessing, is to state the obvious. By allowing the meeting to take place on Indian soil, New Delhi has ensured that it will continue to influence political developments on Nepal.
Additionally India cannot be happy over the reported decision of the Nepalese monarch to buy arms from Pakistan and China. It also reflects Indian unhappiness with the King for not seeking a political solution of the crisis in Nepal as advised by Delhi. The American attitude continues to reflect the US conviction that solution of Nepalese crisis should be found in joint efforts of the Palace and the political partiesa conviction which appears hollow and overtaken by events.
The EU appears to agree with the perceptible Indian shift from the "twin pillars" concept and is unlikely to chart any policy independent of India. One has to bear in mind the strategic partnership which both the US and the EU have established with India, recognizing India as the most important power in South Asia.
In the whole Nepalese imbroglio, the Indian stake appears to be most critical. Apart from Indian obligations under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nepal is in India's backyard and neighbours several insurgent-infested Indian states.
The report that the idea of starting a people's war in Nepal had been hatched in a joint meeting that took place in India in July 1995 between Indian Communist Party (M-L) (People's War) and Nepalese Maoists lends credence to suspicion of links between Nepalese Maoists and Indian insurgent groups.
In the case of ascendancy of Maoists to power in Nepal there is no guarantee that the existing links would not be broadened and deepened. India, therefore, has to act responsibly if it is to be recognized as the preponderant regional powera status Pakistan refuses to recognize and Bangladesh finds difficult to accept.
That India is the third largest economy in Asia and hopes to join the ranks of developed economies in a decade, complemented by sizeable military strength, continues to elude the policy makers of these two countries.
In the case of Nepal, open Indian endorsement of Maoist insurgency, unless the Maoists join a transparent and multi-party democratic process renouncing violence and come to power through free and fair elections, could be regarded as irresponsible behaviour, unsuitable for a country aspiring for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
While there is nothing inherently wrong for the communists to come to power (after all Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela have voted in leftist presidents), the process through which they acquire power has to be fully democratic. This is the lesson the international community has learnt from the turbulent century which has just gone by.