A petty response to big challenges

Nature of challenges the country faces is well known. The political sway of Islamic parties over NWFP and parts of Balochistan is a monumental challenge. One of hasty responses to it has led to an unwinnable war with tribesmen in several Tribal Agencies.

Then the quick reversion to the old pre-independence practices were reaffirmed as a new policy after they had been shown to be inadequate and dated. Despite this political retreat, the war has not ended nor does it look likely to.

Two separate kinds of wars are going on in Balochistan. There are the resurgent Taliban who are making the life of Afghanistan's Karzai regime and his NATO troops difficult. This is causing unending complications in Pakistan's external affairs. A sourness has crept in Pakistan's relations with America, Britain and the west as also with Karzai government; the latter keeps accusing Pakistan of what is aggression. This war of its own kind can get these countries into further trouble, if not wisely handled.

Incidentally Pakistan has to review its Afghan policy in a thorough-going manner; the totally unrealistic dream of dominating large parts of Afghanistan had better be given up. Let us be content with a peaceful, friendly and cooperative relationship with that country on the basis of complete equality, with no interference from Pakistan.

The second war in Balochistan is between Army and its paramilitary ancillaries, on one side, and assorted Balochistan nationalists, on the other. Its intensity waxes and wanes. But what remains constant is tension and fear on both sides. It is totally unacceptable. No one expects the rag-tag Balochistan Liberation Army to triumph over Pakistan Army. But the fratricidal war is simply poison for Pakistan's federal structure.

Dissatisfaction in Sindh is no news. There is little violence but restiveness is pervasive. The ethnic Sindhis are wholly dissatisfied and regard the military regime as a kind of One Unit. The necessity of having to share power in the provincial government with MQM makes them furious. It is still a safe bet that electorally most of Rural Sindh, including smaller cities, is a PPP constituency. The relationship between MQM and PPP remains as explosive as ever. There are fears for the future.

Even if largely non-violent and rather ineffective, the most widespread sentiment in Sindh is one of alienation and people demand more autonomy. Doubtless, MQM has been making energetic overtures to the Sindhis by demanding provincial autonomy even more vociferously than other members of PONAM (Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement). One foregoes the mention of rather petty jealousies and ethnicities that comprises politics in Punjab. One regards them as no big challenge for the polls or after.

The point is the regime, like all military ones before it, began its life with tall promises of solving Pakistan's major problems. There is no point in repeating those promises; the government propaganda machinery has done its job. The more relevant consideration is what has the regime delivered in over six and a half years? It has only aggravated widespread resentment, dissatisfaction and a desire for real change. That precisely had happened in every case of military rule; this fourth time makes the problem grave. The regime has certainly carried out some reforms in administration, police and district governments.

The nature of the reforms, it now turns out, is as if they had been drafted by undergraduates as an academic exercise. The all-important question of centre-province relationship is at an all time low. Then nature of the regime being basically unitary, its inability to make up its mind on controversial questions shows how serious the differences are even within the ruling circles. Differences in the bureaucracy over the division of Indus waters, money, electricity and other resources are well known. One significant issue is that the regime is unable to act as a well-adjusted government; Kalabagh Dam is an example. The inter-provincial coordination is serving the interests of only sustaining some Ministers or civil servants. Political unity among the Pakistanis is also at an all time low, what with polarizations over ideological questions and regional nationalisms.

Much more important for the common man is what he finds in the market place everyday. Economic reality at the grassroots is no tribute to the regime. The regime has been most strenuously propagandist about its own achievements in economic spheres. Doubtless many demands of the IMF were met. The macro-economic indicators show that the economy had been more or less stabilized compared to the default or near default situation that Nawaz Sharif government forced after 1998. But that stability, circa 2004, is now being eroded rapidly. Three major deficits are beginning to emerge: budgetary, trade and current accounts. The architect of the economic Miracle of Pakistan is Mr. Shaukat Aziz who claims that Pakistan is now all set to takeoff; it is already in the league of countries that return high growths. This was based on last year's achievement of GDP growth of 8.4 per cent. Whether this can again be achieved is not certain. But it is possible. Overall, these are results that have won a respect for Mr. Aziz in the western press and his image is attractive abroad.

But Pakistanis cannot forget what happened to Indian politics. There too the market supremacy represented by globalisation paradigm had led to high success. The BJP government was so fascinated by its own achievements that it fought a general election on the slogan of India Shining. The reality on the ground in India however was different. The countryside had been left out and was poverty stricken; farmers' suicides became a big story that could not but have consequences. The BJP lost the election. The current UPA government in India is faced with a painful dilemma: should it persist with the WTO-favoured paradigm or should it dilute it with measures that Indian Left is suggesting. Pakistan too faces increasing unemployment, an intensity of poverty no matter what its true numbers are. The reality for the majority is poverty, unemployment and sky high prices. This is the same masala that cost BJP its rule over India.

Let us forget about India because India has mountainous problems and a mountainous advantage. The advantage it has, and Pakistan does not, is a stable political system of representative democracy. That enables that country to absorb huge shocks and ensures peaceful regime changes through untampered elections. How is Pakistan going to meet the mountainous challenges it faces both in the political and economic spheres is the question.

Nearly all palliatives have been tried and found wanting. Stop-gap arrangements or experiments by novices can make matters worse and it has happened. There is however a way out. The year 2007 is the election year. Let us make it a truly free election. But let it be a preliminary electoral exercise first to get a representative government. That it should, after an interval of, say a year, hold another free election to approve comprehensive reforms that Pakistan actually needs. A whole new social contract is needed. Let that be done after due deliberation and examination by a second truly representative parliament and not by those elected under military's management.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.