Political parties should support 'de-govenmentalisation'

Under the WTO regime, Bangladesh would need to survive meaningfully and to ensure its growth in a sustainable manner. DGN can assist the country in that respect. Because a properly cultivated constructive pluralism in an adequately de-govermentalised operations environment could be instrumental in promoting inter alia cutting-edge decisions, actions and innovations at local, national and other levels.

DGN has been taking place in Bangladesh on a piece-meal basis and its progress is relatively slow. It lacks the required political will; so is the political parties' accountability to the people in pertinent area. Bangladeshis should explore with the political parties the possibility of promulgating an Act focusing on DGN, its implementation requirements and other related matters. The Act should be designed in a way that it will help ensure that a change of political leadership in the government will not lead to abandoning DGN, unless say, a breakthrough replaces DGN in favour of higher national productivity and better governance.

Pursuing DGN in an aggressive manner would be a formidable challenge for Bangladesh. For meeting the challenge, Bangladeshis should be prepared to take hard decisions and be able to withstand the consequences of those decisions, both individually and collectively.

To many Bangladeshis, privatisation is a matter that is associated with some kind of fear. Many Bangladeshis tend to perceive the private sector jobs as relatively less secured. The perception is valid in many respects, particularly when it comes to employee firing practices of private companies.

Due to the absence of a well developed, as well as diverse private sector in the country, the job opportunities in the sector are limited and the in-country market competition is relatively less intense, affecting the product quality and price. While the survival and growth in private sector (say, job-wise) are comparatively competitive, the compensation packages and career prospects in some private companies are lucrative than those in the government. Since the government jobs are, on the other hand, more secure at least in terms of the length of time and the prospect for continuity than those of private sector, the efforts towards commercialisation or privatisation of government or government controlled operations have so far faced a stiff resistance from the job holders and their unions. For most of them, it is: a matter of uncertainty; a situation that has potentials for hurting their coping capacities; and a kind of impact that could shatter their life-long dreams.

An apparently widening gap between profits and social responsibilities of many private sector companies is a matter of concern for Bangladesh. The protection of the law of the land against unfair labour practices on the part of private sector employers, as well as employees is inadequate, and obtaining justice in pertinent areas is often costly in many respects.

There are several reasons for the contemporary beliefs and perceptions concerning privatisation. Some of them are: firstly, the country's social safety net, in its current form, is often of no help to most of those who are at present or would be in the future affected negatively by DGN; secondly, the long term dependence of immediate or extended family member(s) or both on the continuous income of a single job holder in most cases. In an average sense, the current number of bread earners per Bangladeshi family is not encouraging, so is the impact of supplementary family income on family welfare; thirdly, there are a limited re-employment and self-employment opportunities for employment seekers (say, government officials affected by DGN) due, as applicable and inter alia, to their age, skills and mindsets; fourthly, the existing gap between the market requirements and the market oriented focus of the country's education; and fifthly, the inadequacies of investment climate, product marketing facilities (particularly, for small business holders in rural areas) and retraining opportunities for retooling the country's human resources. The factors, such as: relevant process constraints; bureaucratic hard ups; corruption; institution and capacity related deficiencies; the lack of adequate protection for small businesses; and a less than required outcome of the government's regulatory functions in pertinent areas are among the current investment related inadequacies.

A national blue print for DGN is required. It should clearly specify inter alia: i) the commitment and the obligation of the government, the political parties, the development partners and the people of Bangladesh concerning DGN; ii) the potential areas and sub areas for DGN; iii) the modes of intervention, and implementation targets; iv) the mechanics of implementation; v) the networks of partnership; vi) the people's participation modalities; vii) the anticipated risks and outcomes; viii) the controls; ix) the resource requirements; and x) the conditions for the continuity of DGN activities through governmental successions. The blue print should inter alia be built upon the country-wide gains so far in DGN areas and the lessons learned. Provisions should be made for capturing future DGN lessons and best practices say, for other countries to benefit from Bangladeshi experiences in the area.

Strong and sustained political will would be needed for a proper implementation of DGN. The political parties must be prepared to work above party lines for a meaningful outcome.

For a productive DGN regime and an improved state function, Bangladesh would need to do a number of things. For example, it should: expedite the transformation of private sector into the engine of the country's economic growth; accelerate the implementation of free market quality control requirements like, ISO 14000; help communities in their effort to become producers or co-producers of goods and services; make the functions of the national government more support oriented (like, financing or co-financing capital intensive investments), limit (in a progressive manner) those functions to strategic portfolios such as, foreign affairs, national security and defence, finance, planning, information, environment and RDE (research, development and engineering); strengthen the district administrations with resources and accountability, make them the hubs for providing support to local governments (until the local governments become self-reliant); connect the local communities and people with world communities and people and vice versa for mutual benefits through ICT and other means; support the government in its effort towards concentrating more on policy, coordination, result monitoring, controls (including regulatory functions), diplomacy and futuristic activities (among others); introduce nonpartisan municipal elections; re-introduce jury system for the dispensation of justice (initially on a pilot basis); institute a system of periodic reconfirmation (etc.) of sitting supreme court (both the high court and the appellate divisions) judges on the recommendation of an independent judicial commission; promote in-country developments with the support of local inventions and innovations; form an independent arbitration commission for the settlement of disputes between and among political parties (for example) and harness, in that respect and as needed, the support of the SAARC; establish a monitoring cell in the office of the Prime Minister for obtaining the result, outcome and impact of external assistance to the country and reporting those periodically to Bangladeshis and others; and encourage competition among government ministries, for example, in terms of just-in-time realisation of their commitments to Bangladeshis and recognise publicly their success in pertinent areas by declaring them as first, second or third best ministries of the year.

A pragmatic rehabilitation plan for government staff members and others (who would be affected by say, privatisation initiatives) should be drawn along with the initial proposal for privatisation. The rehabilitation plan may inter alia be based on such considerations as: at least 70 per cent of the affected staff members (on the basis of demonstrated potentials) would be trained for a possible placement in the eventual private enterprise(s), the next 20 per cent or so would be assisted through self-employment programmes and the remaining 10 per cent or less than 10 per cent (nearing retirement) would be given the option to retire with full benefits up to and including their age of retirement or time-in-service limit. The total anticipated costs of rehabilitation, the arrangement for meeting the resource requirements, the implementation time-frame and other relevant information of the plan should be made public. The aims would be to improve inter alia transparency in DGN process and attract internal, as well as external resources and support for DGN.

Bangladesh should explore the possibility of introducing a nation-wide unemployment insurance scheme.

The government should review the country's minimum wages more frequently. Likewise, also review the effectiveness of industrial relations instruments and mechanisms in the pursuit of achieving the goals of DGN in a purposeful manner.

The government should establish a national, as well as marketable skills inventory and keep Bangladeshis informed about skills related forecasts from time to time. The outputs of the inventory and the forecasts should form a basis for the country's human resources plans, education plans and DGN plans. The inventory can inter alia be used for attracting FDI and ex-country jobs for Bangladeshis.

The government may explore the possibility of creating a national privatisation fund by attracting foreign remittances (from expatriate Bangladeshis) for the promotion of private sector industries in the country. In that respect, it can also explore the possibility of establishing some kind of consortium.

Bangladesh may seek donors' support for improving the country's regulatory mechanisms and implementing DGN.