Preconditions to dialogue with Hamas
This article will mainly focus on the US and EU's reaction, thus far, to Hamas' victory and its subsequent formation of the government. For ostensible reasons, the clout of the other two partners of the quartet, viz. Russia and the UN, to shape the events in the region is marginal. This Hamas-led PA now faces a serious challenge given the suspension of direct aid by the US and EU; and how Hamas uses its mandate to realize the aspirations of the people of Palestine remains to be seen.
The US and the EU regard Hamas as a terrorist organization and, not quite unexpectedly, have suspended all direct aid to the PA. The preconditions for resumption of aid are: Hamas must (i) recognize Israel, (ii) eschew armed resistance, and (iii) pledge adherence to all bilateral accords signed by the PLO with Israel and the international community. The three preconditions, prima facie, seem fair enough, but an in-depth analysis of these will put the context in its true perspective.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. We will deal with the second precondition first. The post 9/11 dispensation precludes the possibility of armed struggle even for legitimate national liberation movements. The invasion of Iraq, should we suppose, must have been an exception, as in the words of the occupiers they had liberated Iraq -- never mind the use of massive force and colossal "collateral" damage (i.e. the death of tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis). More intriguing than this is the related question of US commitment to democracy, which the occupiers have vowed to establish in Iraq in the wake of their failure to find any traces of weapons of mass destructions (WMD) -- the raison d'être for the invasion of Iraq. The Iraq analogy is germane because the US is now in Iraq purportedly to nurture democracy. Hamas has been catapulted to power through a transparent and democratic process.
The credibility of the election was certified as very fair by none other than former US President Jimmy Carter, who led an observer team of eminent American personalities. Thus, if the US does not engage Hamas, instead attempts to sideline it, this would tantamount to collective punishment of the Palestinian people. The fault of the Palestinians: they exercised their democratic and fundamental rights to choose their own legislators. If such an attitude does not militate against universal adult franchise, what does? The US of course, has records for selectivity in its mission to spread democracy. Its support to the Algerian military to thwart the Islamic Salvation Front led by Dr. Abbasi Madani from coming to power in the early 1990s, and the loss of countless lives in the violence that followed, still resonates across the world.
Curiously, the decision to boycott Hamas is an affront to the Bush Administration's Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI). Those familiar with the GMEI concept, a neocon brainchild, are aware that through this initiative the Bush Administration, inter alia, wants to promote democracy in the Greater Middle East, stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. This belt, viewed as the "Islamic Crescent" is supposedly a great threat to Western civilization. Hence, is the need for promotion of democracy in the Greater Middle East.
Neoconservatives believe that democracies do not threaten one another; hence is the need for promotion of democracy in the Greater Middle East. If that is the case, isn't there an urgent need for dialogue between the US and EU, on the one hand, and Hamas on the other? The US can shun Hamas at the expense of its further alienation from the Palestinians, and by extension the Arab masses. It is common knowledge, and the US knows it very well, that if universal adult suffrage was applied elsewhere in the Arab world, results similar to those in Palestine would be replicated. This is simply because of the yawning gap between the legitimate aspirations of the Arab people vis-Ã -vis the policies of their rulers.
Alternatively, American apathy towards Hamas implies, or at least can be interpreted, that the US would stand for democracy in the Middle East, provided that such democracy suited and served the interests of Israel. For that to be the case, the elections in Palestine would need to be doctored and not free and fair. Across the political divide in the US, the anti-Hamas attitude is quite pronounced.
Senator Hillary Clinton was quite bellicose in her address to an audience at Princeton University on 18 January 2006, a week before the Palestinian elections. Anticipating a Hamas victory, she not only demanded that the Bush Administration should not recognize Hamas, but cautioned other sovereign states of the world from doing so. Such a mindset indicates that the US is likely to pursue the GMEI selectively.
The inherent absurdity of this precondition has been succinctly exposed by columnist Michael Scheuer, in one of his recent articles titled "Embracing a Lethal Tar Baby." He recalls how angrily Nikita Khrushchev, the late Soviet Premier, pounded the desk in the UN with his shoe and vowed to "bury" the United States. All leaders of the former USSR preceding and succeeding him (except Mikhail Gorbachev) were firm believers in the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism which prophesied the demise of the US and all other capitalist states. Faced with such a formidable adversary who overtly denied America's right to exist, the US never demanded that the Soviets unilaterally disarm or renounce their Marxist-Leninist ideals. In striking contrast, the US is now seeking to impose on Israel's arch-foe, Hamas, a precondition that it never sought to impose on its own sworn enemy.
As for the first precondition that Hamas must recognize Israel, sure enough, for durable peace in the region there has to be a viable two-state solution. But, doesn't recognition have to be quid pro quo? It can not be unilateral in the sense that only Hamas recognizes Israel and its right to exist, while Israel remains indifferent, or at best ambivalent about Palestine. Hamas must have factored in what its predecessor the PLO gained, despite the latter's recognition of Israel in 1989. The humiliation and indignity suffered by the PLO despite its renunciation of arms and political engagements, notably participation in the Madrid "land for peace" deal of 1990 and the Oslo peace accords of 1993, must be weighing heavily in the minds of the Hamas leadership. Thus far, the Hamas leadership responded to this challenge with reasonableness and great acumen. In a recent interview with the Daily Guardian, Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya stated that the issue of recognition of Israel is not the responsibility of Hamas, Al-Fatah, or any other political faction, but depended on the collective decision of the Palestinian people. This was a clear hint for a referendum.
The PLO had recognized Israel in 1989, and if Israel had sincerely adhered to the 1993 Oslo peace accords, a Palestinian State should have been a reality by 2000. In fact, Hamas published a draft of its government program on its website on 11 March 2006; the fifth article of this program which stipulates that the question of recognizing Israel is not within the jurisdiction of one faction, a party, or government, but a decision for the Palestinian people, may pave the way for a referendum.
There have been a plethora of plans and resolutions on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Of these, the one adopted in the Arab League Summit in Beirut in 2002, stipulating that Israel withdraws to pre-1967 war borders in exchange for recognition by all 22 member states of the Arab League, was not given the consideration it deserved. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was instrumental in piloting this resolution which was by far the most fair and objective one. Withdrawal to pre-1967 war borders is not a big ask by any standard, in fact, it is quite conciliatory. Israel would be required to vacate from: (1) East Jerusalem, (2) the Gaza Strip (which it has already done chaotically and unilaterally), (3) the West Bank, and (4) the Golan Heights. However, the Israeli mindset equates withdrawal from illegally occupied lands with making tremendous sacrifice. To Israel, even the most benign resolution is not acceptable unless it meets its unspoken agenda of "Bantustanization" of the future state of Palestine, a state which would only be viable and survive contingent on Israeli's mercy or sympathy. It may be mentioned that the Hamas leadership is also agreeable to the pre-1967 war borders as the basis for a future Palestinian state.
In a statement posted on its website in April 2006, Hamas Deputy Prime Minister Nasseridin Al-Shaer said that the Hamas government was willing to end the Middle East conflict and considered the Arab League resolution adopted in the Beirut summit of 2002, a viable option. DPM Al-Shaer also stated that Hamas was not afraid of paying a political price for peace, but underlined that it must be done in concert with all Arab League members and on a legal basis. Mr. Ghazi Hamad, official spokeman of Hamas also corroborated that they were seriously discussing the plan.
It is necessary to re-examine the second precondition, cessation of armed resistance, again simultaneously with the issue of recognition. Hamas had been observing a ceasefire over a year now, and its leaders have spelt out on occasions that if required it would observe a long-term ceasefire for 20 or 30 years to facilitate the peace process. Theoretically, this falls short of a formal declaration of cessation of hostilities. But, if the objective of the road map, i.e. a viable two-state solution, is not feasible within 20 to 30 years, it perhaps never will be. As such, Hamas' response is not specious. Once a viable state of Palestine is established, there will be no reason for recourse to armed struggle by Hamas. Israeli and Palestinian coexistence would naturally follow.
As for the third pre-condition, Hamas' adherence to the PLO's agreements, it is appropriate to mention what PM Ismail Haniya had to say when recently interviewed by Lally Weymouth (of Newsweek and The Washington Post) at the former's home in the refugee camp in Gaza. Premier Haniyeh stated that his government would review all agreements signed between the PLO and Israel and abide by those that are in the interest of the Palestinian people. Elaborating, he observed that Hamas would honor those accords which would guarantee the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the pre-1967 war borders as its international frontiers. It would also respect those agreements which would facilitate the release of Palestinian prisoners. Overall, Hamas' position has been consistent and accords fairly well with the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.