The role of second chamber in democracy

The founders of the Bangladesh constitution decided to adopt a unicameral legislature. The composition and functions of the second Chamber may vary depending on whether it is adopted by a parliamentary or federal government. In a federation, in addition to its role as a revising body, it may prove effective in maintaining a balance of power among its constituent units. The imbalance of power created in the Lower House, where the members are elected on the basis of the population, may be counterbalanced in the Upper House if provisions are made for the election of its members on the basis of the federating units.

In the US such balance is maintained in the Senate where each state, irrespective of its size and population, elects two members. The US Senate helps to promote national unity among its constituent units by maintaining a parity of representation and protecting the geographical minorities against the tyranny of the majority. The question of maintaining a balance of power among the federating units does not arise as Bangladesh consists of one province. The Senate in the US, apart from taking part in the law making process, also performs some executive functions. Such functions were conferred to the Senate in order to provide safeguards against any arbitrary and or partisan actions of the President. Some important appointments and foreign treaties made by the President are also to be approved by two-thirds members of the Senate.

The Senate in the US, like most other second Chambers in the world, does not function as a revising body. Its authority to perform some executive functions in the form of confirming President's actions was designed to promote organic co- operation and check and balance between the executive and legislative branches of US government..

The Senate, as a second Chamber functions, effectively in the US without creating any rivalry between the two houses because of personal separation of power between the executive and the legislative branch under a Presidential form of government. Bangladesh cannot have a powerful second Chamber like the US because the personal union between the executive and the legislative branch in a parliamentary form of government would provide a scope for constant source of conflict of power between the two houses.

The nomination system under the bicameral legislature, provided it is properly used, may provide scope to select some technocrats as the members of the second Chamber so that the country can benefit from their technical and independent advice. Some of them, despite their interest in politics, would not become the members of the Parliament because they would not like to go through the cumbersome and expensive election procedures. Under the bicameral system, Bangladesh could have been immensely benefited from the technocrats, who as the nominated members of the second Chamber could give their expert opinion on technical matters affecting the vital interests of the country.

The role of a second Chamber in a parliamentary government as a revising body can prove to be more effective in so far as it relates to passing of ordinary laws. In a parliamentary form of government the party in power by virtue of their majority in the legislature, may if they want to, get any law passed to serve their political purpose. The opposition party's authority is limited to making recommendations and tabling amendments with regard to ordinary bills, which the ruling party may reject or accept. In the UK the House of Lords acts as a revising Chamber. Its authority is confined to making suggestions and tabling amendments in order to persuade the House of Commons to review and revise any particular bill. It has no authority to reject any bill altogether. The old hereditary House of Lords has been replaced mostly by appointed life peers. A significant portion of the British electorate is now in favour of introducing some form of democratic element in its composition. An introduction of a democratic element in its composition might necessitate a change in its functions in order to ensure that its effectiveness as a revising body can be strengthened.

In the UK the existence of an unwritten constitution has rendered it unnecessary to amend the constitution. The passing of any law by a simple majority is likely to have the same effect as amending the constitution. Although at present the House of Lords has no right to reject any bill altogether, such power may be granted, in some form or other, following the inclusion of a democratic element in its composition. Provisions may be made so that its authority is confined to making suggestions and recommendations in all matters except where it is likely to infringe the constitutional or the individual rights. In such cases the Commons should not be given the right to override the decisions of the Lords. Such compromise would maintain its status as a revising body, while improving its effectiveness as a Second Chamber as far as it affects any legislation dealing with the constitutional or the individual rights. The British government, while taking into account the opinion of the public and the other political parties, should decide whether or not a change in its composition should also be matched by a corresponding change in its functions. `

The party in power in a parliamentary government may require the support of the opposition to amend the constitution because it normally requires a two-thirds majority, which they normally may not have in the legislature. The provisions for a second Chamber with an authority to act as a revising body could serve a useful purpose to protect the people against the tyranny of majority rule in a parliamentary democracy. In the absence of a second Chamber to put a check on the unrestricted power of the Lower House there is a danger that the ruling party, provided they have a two- thirds majority, may if they want to, amend the constitution if they find any of its provisions blocking their attempt to pass a law in order to serve their political motives. Although it may not be always the case, the ruling party may occasionally have a two-thirds majority in the legislature.

Like the UK, Bangladesh has a parliamentary government where a party or the combination of parties is to form a government who are likely to command a majority in the legislature. The government with its majority in the Parliament can get any bill passed without accepting any amendment made by the opposition. In the UK it may happen, although in rare cases, that the government can get a bill passed with the support of the opposition members, despite the fact that the bill was not backed by its own members. Occasionally, the government may also accept any amendments made by the opposition. The political parties in Bangladesh have not yet achieved the political maturity so that they can refrain from abusing their power by virtue of their majority in the Parliament.

The arguments outlined above should, I think, make a valid case for the adoption of a second Chamber in Bangladesh. Should it act as a suggestive body like other second Chambers? It cannot be given the same power as the Lower House to make it a rival body. Its authority should be confined to making suggestions and tabling amendments, coupled with the power to overrule the Lower House with regard to bills designed to amend the constitution. Such provisions, if incorporated in the constitution, will not only provide a safeguard against ill-considered and hasty legislation but at the same time will help to refrain the government from amending the constitution in order to serve their political interests.

How the second Chamber should be composed would depend on the purpose for which its provisions are made in the constitution: Should it act as revising Chamber, accepting the ultimate authority of the Lower House or should it be something greater, more like the Senate of the US? Any second Chamber having the same power as the Senate of the US must be composed on the same basis as the Lower House. In other words, its members should be elected by the people directly. Opinion may differ as to how the second Chamber should be composed but every body should agree that the second Chamber, provided it acts as a revising body, should not be directly elected by the people in order to ensure that it does not become a source of constant conflict of power. A second Chamber, if elected by the people directly, is likely to undermine the supremacy of the Lower House affecting the fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy.

However, the Second Chamber in Bangladesh, if composed with 50 percent of members elected by the people directly and 50 percent nominated from among the technocrats, having a different length of time from that of the Lower House, is likely to provide adequate safeguard against any tyrannical use of power by the party or parties commanding a majority in the Lower House.

A K Md Abedur Rahaman is a retired civil servant in UK