The War of Liberation, Nixon and Kissinger

Freedom fighters in Dhaka street, (below) Nixon and Kissinger.

The documents detail Nixon and Kissinger's policy of "tilt" toward Pakistan and reveal their "scant sympathy" towards the suffering humanity and their lack of sensitiveness to the "carnage" in Bangladesh. Although their Consul-General in Dhaka, Archer K. Blood, and other Mission officials had sent detailed accounts of atrocities committed by Pakistani troops and even gone to the extent of publicly submitting a note of dissent to the American policy, the Nixon administration refused to take any step to restrain the military regime. Even the eyewitness accounts by US journalists and citizens who were evacuated from Bangladesh failed to move them.

Fortunately, the vast majority of US public did not share the apathy of the Nixon administration and had openly expressed their support for, and solidarity with, the distressed people of Bangladesh. The US Congress, both Senate and House of Representative, kept the issue under constant review and passed important bills to suspend US military and economic assistance to Pakistan. The US media prominently covered the genocidal war perpetrated by Pakistanis in Bangladesh. Even schoolchildren saved lunch money to help Bangladeshi refugees. Yet, Nixon and his National Security Adviser Kissinger were unmoved. Despite various prodding, they did not act to prevent the genocide in Bangladesh; on the contrary, they supported the Pakistani military regime, which was acting as a secret conduit for a diplomatic opening to Beijing.

I was posted in Washington DC during that crucial period, first as a Pakistani diplomat and then, after declaring our allegiance to Bangladesh, as a founding member of Bangladesh Mission/ Embassy. Therefore, I was a witness to the role of Nixon administration during our War of Independence. Naturally, these newly released documents are of immense interest to me.

Most of the materials contained in the 900-page volume are known to us since several important books have already been published on the subject. Soon after the War, noted columnist Jack Anderson had published the book "Anderson Papers" which had given us some insights to the confidential National Security Council Meetings in White House during the war. Kissinger, in his memoirs "White House Years", had tried to justify the Administration's actions (or inactions) at the crucial moments of our nationhood. What really surprised me when I went through the documents was the level to which Nixon and Kissinger had stooped when the developments in South Asia had not proceeded in the desired manner.

Mrs. Gandhi visited Washington in early November as part of her global effort to explain New Delhi's position on the Bangladesh situation. Nixon had two rounds of meetings with her. The first meeting took place on 4 November 1971. Mrs. Gandhi primarily emphasised the need for immediate release of Bangabandhu, and political resolution of the crisis. Nixon, as confirmed by these documents, claimed that they were pressing on Islamabad not to execute Bangabandhu but doubted whether Yahya Khan would "survive" if Bangabandhu was released at that stage. Why on earth should he be so concerned about the fate of a military ruler whose barbarity had brought miseries to millions in the region?

Instead of taking initiative for the political resolution of the problem, Nixon was more interested in bringing in a semblance of normalcy in the region by sending humanitarian aid, deployment of international observers, and mutual troop withdrawal by India and Pakistan. He told her that "nothing could be achieved by the disintegration of Pakistan" and warned that any outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan would be totally "unacceptable" to US. Earlier, Washington had even gone to the extent of threatening New Delhi with cutting off economic aid if she went to war. All these tough talks were clearly aimed at intimidating Mrs. Gandhi, and preventing her from taking any military action against Pakistan.

Mrs. Gandhi had received members of Bangladesh Mission in Washington DC at the Blair House (the official Guest house of the US President) right after her meeting at the White House. Our Mission Chief, M.R. Siddiqi, had led us to that meeting. Since she was made to wait at the White House, she arrived late for our meeting. We were introduced to her and she received us very warmly. From her discussions it was apparent that the meeting had not gone well, and that Nixon had very little interest in the resolution of the Bangladesh issue.

The documents reveal that Nixon had met Kissinger at the Oval Office the following morning. Kissinger reassured his boss that the latter had met his objective. Nixon boasted that they "really slobbered over the old witch". Kissinger's overall assessment about the conflict was: "The Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting the war there. To them East Pakistan is no longer the issue." Nixon also believed that "India was trying to start another war to take advantage of the opportunity to destroy Pakistan."

Nixon had a second round of meeting with Mrs. Gandhi on 5 November, and he hardly made any reference to the crisis in South Asia. Instead, he talked about other international developments, especially his planned visit to China. It is a pity that Nixon, the champion of democracy and human rights of the cold war era, cared little for the most appalling violation of human rights, and the trampling of our democratic rights by their ally Pakistan. Nixon refused to view our independence struggle in its proper perspective.

Some believe that the Nixon administration had viewed the developments in South Asia in the East-West bipolarity context of the cold war era. Washington had considered India's signing of the mutual security treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971 as a blank check to New Delhi in its confrontation with Islamabad. Nixon had asked Soviet leaders not to encourage India, and had warned India of dire consequences if it started a war with Pakistan.

These documents demonstrate that when the India-Pakistan war finally started, Nixon administration tried for the adoption of a ceasefire resolution at the UN Security Council. The Western draft called for withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to internationally recognised boundaries without making any reference to political resolution of the conflict. Soviet Union vetoed this move twice.

As the Pakistani army was collapsing, Nixon decided to send the seventh fleet to the Bay of Bengalostensibly to evacuate the US citizens, but in reality it was meant to bolster their morale and to intimidate the Indians. Even Nixon, as per these documents, urged their hitherto adversary Beijing, through Kissinger, to deploy troops on its border with India to put pressure on New Delhi. It is true that Beijing too had supported Pakistan and had opposed our liberation struggle but, fortunately, they did not fall for the Nixon plan and refused to get militarily involved in the war.

These documents also confirm that Nixon's strategy of putting pressure on India from north and south was aimed at helping Pakistani troops to hold out the war for at least a few more weeks, which would have given them another opportunity to build a new consensus at the UN Security Council for a cease fire, mutual troop withdrawal to internationally recognised boundaries and deployment of UN peace keeping forces. They had hoped that this would defuse Bangladesh independence movement and protect break-up of their ally Pakistan.

The Nixon plan did not work. Ninety-three thousand Pakistani troops could not sustain the war for even two weeks. The strategy and the blitzkrieg military attack on the occupation forces by our valiant freedom fighters and the India-Bangladesh joint forces, led by Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora, forced the early capitulation of the Pakistani forces, leading to their surrender on 16 December 1971. Bangladesh emerged as an independent state.

In the face of growing domestic and international pressure, Nixon had to extend diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh in April 1972. He also wrote a letter to Bangabandhu expressing his Administration's interest in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The letter was personally handed over to Bangabandhu by the US Mission Chief Spivak. In a short time, our Mission in Washington DC received a reply from Bangabandhu. We were advised by State Department to forward it through diplomatic channel but we were told by Dhaka to insist on reciprocity. Finally, after waiting for few weeks, Nixon had to receive our Mission Chief Enayet Karim at the White House. However, when Bangabandhu visited Washington in October 1974, Nixon was nowhere in the scene. He had resigned a few months earlier to avoid impeachment for the Watergate misdeeds.

Syed Muazzem Ali is a former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh.