Whom will the Awami League supporters vote for?
In the upcoming national elections, even if Awami League (AL) does not contest as a participant, it will very likely haunt the entire exercise. It is an irony of democracy—or perhaps its peculiar beauty—that although the party did everything to undermine democracy in Bangladesh, one cannot ignore the sheer weight of its followers for the sake of democracy itself. The most pressing question, therefore, is: how will AL supporters shape the forthcoming elections?
Before delving into possible answers, let us first assess the likelihood of the AL joining the elections. Given the ban on its activities, the suspension of its registration, and the removal of its election symbol—the boat—from the Election Commission's list, the party is effectively out of the electoral game.
Moreover, the latest amendment to the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973, which renders any person formally charged with crimes against humanity at the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) ineligible to contest elections, has further shrunk the legal space for the party's leadership. AL's high command, too, is very unlikely to participate in any election under the Dr Yunus-led government. Either way, AL supporters will not have the opportunity to vote for their party.
So, what choices remain for them?
The AL leaders and activists have yet to come to terms with the July uprising that ended their 15-and-a-half-year authoritarian rule. That is why they seem to show no remorse for what they have done; rather, many remain in a vindictive mood. Their offline and online activities related to the elections suggest that disrupting the polls is high on their agenda.
This disruption could take several forms. AL might urge its supporters to boycott the elections, believing that the absence of their "large" voter base from the polling booths would render the turnout less credible, both nationally and internationally. Many AL supporters may also choose to abstain from voting even without a formal directive from the party.
One also cannot rule out the possibility of the party resorting to violent means to intimidate voters and keep them away from the polls, or employing other machinations to disrupt the entire electoral process even before the vote.
Our recent political history—particularly the elections of 2014 and 2024—offers ample examples of such attempts at electoral disruption.
Another option on the table, discussed since the ban on AL activities in May 2025, has been the idea of developing a "refined" AL—one led by party figures with relatively clean reputations and no involvement in the atrocities committed during the party's 15-and-a-half-year rule, including the days of the July uprising. The idea has its precedent in the reorganisation of the AL under the leadership of Tajuddin Ahmad's widow, Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, following the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and several senior party leaders, although the context was different.
Finally, being devoid of other options, the votes of AL supporters will be up for grabs by the very parties they have long detested. Ironically, the main contenders in the upcoming elections—the BNP, Jamaat, and the NCP—although fierce haters of the AL as a party, are actively trying to attract its supporters to their camp.
To fill the shoes of Zohra Tajuddin, names already being speculated include her son and daughter, the former Speaker Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury, AL veteran Saber Hossain Chowdhury, and former Narayanganj City Corporation Mayor Salina Hayat Ivy. The recent episode of three Western diplomats visiting Saber Hossain Chowdhury without following regular diplomatic protocol has lent further credence to this speculation. Earlier, influential National Citizen Party (NCP) leader and frontline activist of the July uprising, Hasnat Abdullah, even referred to pressure from the army to form a "refined" AL, though Army Headquarters later dismissed his statement as "laughable" and "immature."
A "refined" AL without Sheikh Hasina might well be in the works, but an immediate success would be difficult to achieve, given that the party's structure and the deep personal loyalty of its activists to Sheikh Hasina leave little room for the emergence of an alternative leadership. Moreover, how AL supporters would receive such a formation remains an open question.
Another possibility is that the AL could try to re-emerge through its old allies, whose activities have not yet been officially banned. The most prominent among them is the Jatiya Party. There is speculation that AL supporters across the country will rally behind Jatiya Party candidates, some of whom could turn out to be shadow AL members. However, this scenario has found little support from either the AL or Jatiya Party leadership. The latter, moreover, remains deeply divided by internal factions.
Meanwhile, parties such as Jamaat, the NCP, and Gono Odhikar Parishad have been pressing the interim government to ban the activities of the Jatiya Party and exclude it from the electoral race, citing the very possibility of such collaboration.
A different interpretation of their motives, however, also exists. It suggests that by removing the Jatiya Party, these parties would not only eliminate a key competitor in the upcoming election but also attempt to capture seats in North Bengal—a region traditionally regarded as the Jatiya Party's stronghold.
Finally, being devoid of other options, the votes of AL supporters will be up for grabs by the very parties they have long detested. Ironically, the main contenders in the upcoming elections—the BNP, Jamaat, and the NCP—although fierce haters of the AL as a party, are actively trying to attract its supporters to their camp.
BNP's message for them is simple: it pledges to create an inclusive political environment, and leave the Awami League's fate in the hands of the people. The party also stresses that it upholds the spirit of the Liberation War and secularism—values that continue to matter to many AL supporters. Jamaat, on the other hand, is attempting to win them over by offering security, claiming that since August 5, AL activists have faced harassment primarily from BNP supporters.
Some analysts place Jamaat ahead of the BNP in this race to court AL voters, arguing that the traditional hostility between the BNP and AL makes it easier for Jamaat to appeal to AL supporters. They also point out that, unlike the BNP—which already has a large support base and limited incentives to offer to political converts—Jamaat, as a revitalised but still emerging political force, is hungrier for new recruits. Several recent surveys showing an increase in Jamaat's popularity, as well as the results of Ducsu and Jucsu elections, in which Shibir made a triumphant comeback, are interpreted as evidence of this shifting dynamic. Adding to this is the fact that many younger AL supporters may not be as emotionally attached to the narratives of the Liberation War as their predecessors are or were.
Amidst all the despair, a flicker of hope still remains for AL supporters in the growing international pressure to make the upcoming election "inclusive." If that also fails, we may witness what the interim government calls a "historic election," but for reasons unrelated to what it means by this—an election in which a large segment of voters, though disenfranchised, will still have shaped its outcome.
Shamsuddoza Sajen is a journalist and researcher. He can be contacted at sajen1986@gmail.com.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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